Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in Relation to Political Thought

Was Wittgenstein a Liberal Philosopher?

“…Richard Rorty puts a pragmatist spin on Wittgenstein's work and suggests that liberalism is a mode of thought with greater utility than others; one which allows us to cope better. And Alice Crary, while critical of Rorty, suggests that the lessons learned from her own interpretation of Wittgenstein are "reflected in forms of social life that embody the ideals of liberal democracy" [Crary (2000), p. 141]. 3 In this paper I will agree with Brice that there is not a particularly strong case in favour of Wittgenstein being a liberal and nor is there a particularly strong case to be made in favour of liberalism using Wittgenstein's philosophical writings.…”

“…Alice Crary, in her article 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Relation to Political Thought', suggests that the lesson we learn from Wittgenstein about "investigating established modes of thought and speech [is]…one [she suspects] we would find reflected in forms of social life that embody the ideals of liberal democracy" [Crary (2000), p. 141]. What is meant by 'liberal democracy' is not perfectly clear but this term is typically used to distinguish modern, capitalist, representative democracies with elections, human rights, and civil liberties, from both other kinds of democracies (e.g.…”

“…A state might count as a liberal democracy whether it has a social democratic government or a conservative one and so to say that the lesson we learn from Wittgenstein is reflected in forms of social life embodying the ideals of liberal democracy is not to say that Wittgenstein was a liberal or that his philosophy has liberal implications, and so her claim is weaker than the one made by Eldridge. In 'Wittgenstein's Pragmatic Strain' Crary suggests that lessons from Wittgenstein might help to resolve disputes between liberals and communitarians and so the suggestion is that her own position combines elements of the two approaches [Crary (2003), pp. 369-390].…”

“…(i) One way in which Rorty and Wittgenstein differ is in how they conceive their relationship to traditional philosophy. Rorty's pragmatist line is that "[c]riticisms of other philosophers' distinctions and problematics should charge relative inutility rather than 'meaninglessness ' or 'illusion' or 'incoherence'" [Rorty (1998), p. 45], whereas, as Alice Crary notes,"it is a signature gesture of Wittgenstein's philosophy… to appeal to nonsense as a term of philosophical criticism" [Crary (2000), p. 128] and Crary's take on Wittgenstein is supported by remarks that Wittgenstein himself made, such as his remark that "[t]he results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense…" [Wittgenstein (2009), §119]. 34 (ii) Wittgenstein does not think of his work in philosophy as consisting in creating new vocabularies as Rorty does.…”

“…(iv) It follows from Wittgenstein's account of philosophy as involving uncovering or discovering nonsense that he would not want to affirm the negation of the traditional philosophical 'theories' that he examines, because the negation of nonsense is itself nonsense. However, as Alice Crary [Crary (2000), pp. 127-128] and Hilary Putnam have observed, Rorty seems to want to do something like affirming the negation of traditional philosophical posi-tions.…”