Withdrawal from the Union

Wyrozumska, Anna

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-19507-5_14

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Prior to the Convention, the legality of unilateral exit from the EU had been contentious (Athanassiou, 2009; Berglund, 2006; Harbo, 2008; Herbst, 2006; Hofmeister, 2010; Weiler, 1985; Wyrozumska, 2012). Most of the cited authors do not take a strong position themselves.…”

Section: The Eu’s Adoption Of An Exit Right At the European Conventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While the first two arguments undermine the claim that the treaties are silent on exit (so that VCLT Art. 56 does not apply), the third argument on the ‘primacy of EC law’ implies that Member States could not withdraw unilaterally, because they are not allowed to overturn the application of EU law to their citizens (Wyrozumska, 2012: 1394). To conclude, while unilateral exit was possible according to some, it clearly would have been more difficult and costlier prior to Article 50.…”

Section: The Eu’s Adoption Of An Exit Right At the European Conventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50

Huysmans

2019

European Union Politics

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Many international organizations and the vast majority of federations lack exit clauses. Existing theoretical explanations of this stylized fact focus on issues of credible commitment, signaling, and the risk of strategic exploitation. However, such accounts are unable to explain the adoption of Article 50 by the European Union, which allows unilateral withdrawal. I theorize and demonstrate empirically that in the case of the European Union, an exit-voice logic lies at its origin during the 2002-2003 European Convention. As a protection to undesired policy changes post entry, countries of the 2004 Eastern accession demanded an exit right. Underlying the fear for policy changes was their much lower level of economic development and corresponding differences in policy preferences. As a mirror image, rich outliers like the United Kingdom and Denmark also supported Article 50, which likely contributed to its final adoption through the Treaty of Lisbon.

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Section: The Eu’s Adoption Of An Exit Right At the European Conventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Eu’s Adoption Of An Exit Right At the European Conventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50

Huysmans

2019

European Union Politics

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“…Opinions of academics are divided on the question whether the right to withdraw from the Union had existed under general international law prior to the inclusion of Article 50. 3 According to Wyrozumska (2012), such a right had not existed due to the specific contents of the founding treaties, so that inclusion Art. 50 TEU marked a substantial change in the overall institutional nature and structure of the Union (Wyrozumska, 2012: 362-363).…”

Section: Article 50 Teumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For an overview of mutually opposed opinions on the subject, see:Wyrozumska, 2012. 4 TFEU -Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European UnionOJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Withdrawal from the European Union: Consequences under EU law and international law

Lukić-Radović¹

2020

Zb Pravnog fak Niš

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This article provides analysis of the most prominent legal issues arising as a consequence of a voluntary withdrawal of a Member State from the European Union pursuant to Article 50 TEU. Particular attention is given to the aspects which have not been explicitly regulated, as well as to those that remain unclear due to the complex wording of Article 50 TEU. Following the introduction, the first section focuses on the termination of application of EU law. The second section provides a more detailed insight into the consequences of the voluntary withdrawal on the issues related to the EU citizenship. The next section elaborates on the legal framework for establishing relations between the withdrawing state and the EU under international law. Finally, the last section of the paper analyzes the consequences for the position of the withdrawing state vis-à-vis international organizations and under international law in general.

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“…Dougan (2016) called the Brexiteers “dishonest” and “criminally irresponsible”, whereas the Advertising Standards Authority merely noted that political communications were not covered by its codes, that otherwise require honesty and truthfulness (ASA, 2016; White and Johnston, 2016). There was no coherent view of what Brexit meant (Table I), how long it might take, what was to be negotiated under the poorly drafted Article 50 TEU (Treaty on the European Union)(Hofmeister, 2010; Wyrozumska, 2012) and the separate EU–UK trade agreement, or how four decades of EU legislation, only some of which had been transposed, was to be continued, revised or repealed, to provide for the promised improved competitiveness and greater economic freedom, now that the dead hand of Brussels had been cast off (Mason, 2012). In particular, there was no view on whether the UK was to remain part of the single market, a territory without internal borders or other regulatory obstacles for the free movement of goods and services (EC, 2016c), or of the EU Customs Union[1].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The implications of Brexit for the governance of telecommunications markets in the United Kingdom

Sutherland

2017

DPRG

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Purpose This paper aims to analyse the implication of the exit of the UK from the European Union (a.k.a. Brexit). Design/methodology/approach This paper analyses the options for the UK and the freedom this creates for the government to design its system of governance for the telecommunications and related economic sectors. Findings Brexit, other than the Norway Option or membership of the European Economic Area, allows the UK Government considerable freedom to reshape its system of governance for telecommunications. The strongest influence in such a redesign would be vested commercial interests, with the risk of subsequent underperformance and insufficient rigour. Research limitations/implications Events have moved relatively quickly, yet the outcome of the negotiations remains difficult to predict, beyond broad scenarios. Social implications There will be a need for greater involvement of consumers and business users in the process of recasting the regulatory governance system if it is not to be for the benefit of vested interests. Originality/value This is the first substantive analysis of Brexit for the telecommunications sector.

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Withdrawal from the Union

Cited by 5 publications

References 16 publications

Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50

Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50

Withdrawal from the European Union: Consequences under EU law and international law

The implications of Brexit for the governance of telecommunications markets in the United Kingdom

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