With status decline in sight, voters turn radical right: how do experience and expectation of status decline shape electoral behaviour?

Abstract

We distinguish between the experience and expectation of subjective status decline in relation to electoral behaviour. Studies often link support for radical parties, especially radical right ones, to voters’ experience of status decline. A few other studies argue that voters’ expectation of status decline also triggers radical right support. Without precise measures of both perceptions, it has been difficult to distinguish which (or both) is most relevant for radical right support in Western Europe and the USA. Using survey data from 2018 (n = 4,076) and 2020 (n = 2,106) in Finland, we could precisely measure and distinguish between voters’ experience and expectation of status decline. Descriptively, voters who have experienced status decline have low income, whereas voters who expect status decline have (lower)middle income. Using multivariate analyses, we find that voters who expect status decline consistently prefer radical right parties more than voters who expect status improvement. However, there is no robust evidence of radical right support among voters who have experienced status decline. These findings suggest that the expectation, not experience, of status decline drives radical right support. If these expectations trigger radical right support in Nordic welfare states, they may be even more pertinent in less comprehensive welfare states.

Mobilization of shared victimhood in the radical right populist Finns Party supporters’ identity work: A narrative–discursive approach to populist support

“…The adopted analytical tools from critical discursive psychology allowed us to identify four recurring interpretative repertoires from the material, namely, the diminishing meaning of Finnishness, the loss of social status, mistrust in the political elite and the interference of green liberal values. These interpretative repertoires resemble the results of previous studies examining populism (e.g., Im et al., 2022; Mols & Jetten, 2014, 2020; Spruyt et al., 2016; Staerklé et al., 2022; Urbanska et al., 2021). These societal developments were portrayed as threatening the interviewees’ and the perceived ingroup's unity, social status, political participation, traditions and ways of living, which echo the key identity principles in identity process theory and required the interviewees to seek to reattain an identity congruent with these principles (Breakwell, 1986).…”

“…These interpretative repertoires resemble the results of previous studies examining populism (e.g., Im et al, 2022;Mols & Jetten, 2014Spruyt et al, 2016;Staerklé et al, 2022;Urbanska et al, 2021).…”

“…The former line of research is based on the idea that populist voting is fuelled by changes in objective socio‐economic conditions affecting people's perceived cultural (e.g., Norris & Inglehart, 2019), social (e.g., Hogg, 2021; Mols & Jetten, 2017) and/or economic (e.g., Bos et al., 2020; Dehdari, 2022) status. The effects of these changes have been conceptualized as shared grievances and discontent (Giebler et al., 2021; Mayer, 2022), relative deprivation (Bos et al., 2020; Mols & Jetten, 2016), economic distress (Dehdari, 2022; Manunta et al., 2022), self‐uncertainty (Hogg, 2021), expected status decline (Im et al., 2022) and social exclusion (Gidron & Hall, 2020). However, as Mols and Jetten (2020) argued, these demand‐side factors can only partially explain the populist appeal because the relationship between populist support and macro‐economic trends tends to be complex and non‐linear at times.…”

Fairness and Support for Populist Parties

“…Our findings also point to the need for more research into the political effects of subjective uncertainty, an issue that has not yet attracted much attention in political science. It may be that support for the populist right is inspired not simply by nostalgia for the past but by fears about the future, as an emerging literature on automation implies (Anelli et al, 2021;Häusermann et al, 2021;Im et al, 2019Im et al, , 2023.…”

Unpolitical solutionism: Wealth elite sentiments against democracy and politics

“…So far, most empirical studies concerning discontent with liberal democracy and democratic procedures have focused on societies' less‐well‐off groups or the (white male) working class and their feelings of resentment and alienation (Lamont et al., 2017; Lamont, 2019; Noordzij et al., 2021). Many scholars emphasize the discontent felt by those who have lost their jobs or fear for future because of economic globalisation, restructuring and automation (e.g., Im et al., 2023; Rodrik, 2018). Such feelings have been interpreted as having led to anti‐establishment views and support for authoritarian forms of populism (Gidron & Hall, 2017; Noordzij et al., 2021).…”