Wishful Thinking about the Future: Does Desire Impact Optimism?

Križan, Zlatan; Windschitl, Paul D.

doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00169.x

Cited by 66 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Including the trade‐off between optimism and confidence decreased forecasters' belief that a more confident forecast was more accurate than a less confident forecast (no trade‐off: M = 7.17, SD = 2.08; trade‐off condition: M = 6.40, SD = 2.30), t (131) = 2.04, p = .044, d = .35. This result most probably represents an instance of a desirability bias; in other words, people tend to believe that positive or desirable events more likely to occur than negative or undesirable events (Krizan & Windschitl, ).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Examining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in future forecasts

Stavrova

Evans

2018

Behavioral Decision Making

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Confident business forecasters are seen as more credible and competent ("confidence heuristic"). We explored a boundary condition of this effect by examining how individuals react to the trade-off between confidence and optimism. Using hypothetical scenarios, we examined this trade-off from the perspectives of judges (i.e., business owners who hired analysts to make sales predictions) and forecasters (i.e., the analysts hired to make predictions). Participants were assigned to the role of either judges or forecasters and were asked to rate 2 potential forecasts. In the "no trade-off" condition, the 2 forecasts were aligned in optimism and confidence (the more confident forecast was also more optimistic); in the "trade-off" condition, the more confident forecast was less optimistic. In Experiment 1, judges were more likely to positively evaluate confident forecasters when confident forecasters were the more (vs. less) optimistic ones. Experiment 2 demonstrated that forecasters were aware of judges' preferences for optimism and strategically relied on methods that resulted in more optimistic (but less reliable) predictions. Experiment 3 directly compared the perspectives of judges and forecasters, revealing that forecasters overestimated judges' preferences for optimism over confidence. The present studies show that forecasters and judges have different views of the trade-off between confidence and optimism and that forecasters may unnecessarily sacrifice accuracy for optimism. What factors shape perceptions of forecasts and forecasters? Advice-taking research has shown that advisor confidence is a primary factor in perceptions of advisor credibility (Price & Stone, 2004;Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001;Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). Confidence may serve as a cue to the advisor's expertise: People might trust confident advisors more because they assume that confidence is a direct consequence of expertise-the phenomenon labeled "confidence heuristic" (Price & Stone, 2004). -----------------------------------------------------------This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Examining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in future forecasts

Stavrova

Evans

2018

Behavioral Decision Making

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“…Considerable evidence indicates that a capacity for motivated cognition, a variety of SD, helps us to attain our goals. Objects we desire may appear larger (Bruner & Goodman 1947) or closer (Balcetis & Dunning 2010) to us, and individuals predict that desired, randomly determined outcomes will occur (e.g., Babad 1997; but see Krizan & Windschitl 2009). Such desirebiased perceptions and predictions can cause us to frame situations in terms of possible gains, making us more likely to pursue courses of action that will allow us to achieve desirable outcomes (e.g., Bandura 1989Bandura , p. 1177Sternberg & Kolligan 1990).…”

Section: Selfmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

2011

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In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.

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“…While several other forms of positive illusions have been identified in the psychological literature (e.g., self-serving bias and wishful thinking, Krizan and Windschitl, 2009, Shepperd et al, 2008), we will consider the following three forms: (1) the illusion of control, which is an exaggerated belief in one’s capacity to control independent, external events (e.g., Langer & Roth, 1975); (2) the better than average effect (sometimes also called the superiority illusion), which is the perception of oneself, one’s past behaviour, and one’s lasting features as more positive than is the case (“I am more talented than the average person”) (e.g., Brown, 2012); (3) unrealistic optimism, which is the “tendency for people to believe that they are less likely to experience negative events and more likely to experience positive events than are other people” (Shepperd, Carroll, Grace, & Terry, 2002, p. 65). In our paper, we use the expressions ‘unrealistic optimism’ and ‘optimism bias’ interchangeably, which is common practice in the literature.…”

Section: Unrealistic Optimism and Other Positive Illusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What is unrealistic optimism?

Jefferson

Bortolotti

Kuzmanovic

2017

Consciousness and Cognition

169

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HighlightsThere are a number of controversial questions regarding the nature and causes of unrealistic optimism.We argue that unrealistically optimistic cognitions should be considered beliefs rather than desires or hopes.Optimistically biased beliefs are frequently false but establishing falsity in individual cases is difficult and sometimes impossible.Optimistically biased beliefs are epistemically irrational because they are unwarranted and their responsiveness to counter-evidence is limited.

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Wishful Thinking about the Future: Does Desire Impact Optimism?

Abstract: Although we have suggested that wishful thinking might be less pervasive than most of us think, doesn't the fact that people often express unwarranted

Cited by 66 publications

References 66 publications

Examining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in future forecasts

Examining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in future forecasts

The evolution and psychology of self-deception

What is unrealistic optimism?

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