WINNER OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY PRIZE 2010: The simplicity of mutual knowledge

Wilby, Michael

doi:10.1080/13869791003759963

Cited by 21 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…For example, according to Lewis [25], for S and H to have common knowledge that S uttered x, H would need know that S knew that H knew that S uttered x, and S would need to know that H knew this, and so on. Recent work has shown, however, that cognitively undemanding explications of publicity can be given [17,27]. On these views, S and H need only stand in such a relationship (e.g.…”

Section: The Nature Of Gricean Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Convergent minds: ostension, inference and Grice's third clause

Moore¹

2017

Interface Focus.

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A prevailing view is that while human communication has an 'ostensive-inferential' or 'Gricean' intentional structure, animal communication does not. This would make the psychological states that support human and animal forms of communication fundamentally different. Against this view, I argue that there are grounds to expect ostensive communication in non-human clades. This is because it is sufficient for ostensive communication that one intentionally addresses one's utterance to one's intended interlocutor-something that is both a functional pre-requisite of successful communication and cognitively undemanding. Furthermore, while ostension is an important feature of intentional communication, the inferences required in Gricean communication may be minimal: ostension and inference may come apart. The grounds for holding that animal communication could not be Gricean are therefore weak. I finish by defending the idea that a 'minimally Gricean' model of communication is a valuable tool for characterizing the communicative interactions of many animal species.

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Section: The Nature Of Gricean Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Convergent minds: ostension, inference and Grice's third clause

Moore¹

2017

Interface Focus.

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“…Although some accounts argue that the recursive process may be unlimited or reflexive (1,7), more empirical accounts suggest it can be limited to a few recursive steps (6,8). In this article, we propose a different approach, one that conceptualizes common ground as a property of a social interaction rather than the consequence of individual recursive mindreading (9). In this approach, common ground is something between two (or more) individuals communicating.…”

Section: Abstract-common Ground; Language Development; Theory Of Mindmentioning

confidence: 99%

Common Ground and Development

Bohn

Köymen

2017

Child Dev Perspectives

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Language and other forms of communication are inherently ambiguous and therefore require some form of common ground to specify the intended meanings of utterances. Theoretical accounts usually focus on interactions between adults and consider recursive mindreading a prerequisite to establishing common ground. Contrasting these accounts, in this article, we offer a developmental perspective on common ground. We propose that instead of using recursive mindreading, infants rely initially on the expectation that communicative partners act rationally in light of previous interactions, which serves as a starting point for common ground to develop. We describe the changing role of common ground across development. Initially, common ground constrains the meaning of ambiguous communicative acts and facilitates children's acquisition of language. Later in development, common ground makes communication efficient by helping speakers coordinate their actions and intentions, and eventually arrive at recursive mindreading.

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“…First, there is an obvious worry that they will lead to an infinite regress. One response to this is that there is no regress of actual mental states because the analysis just characterizes the mental states the co-attenders are disposed to form, so that the infinity is merely potential (Wilby 2010). However, it seems plausible that when co-attenders e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Joint Attention: The PAIR Account

Schmitz

2024

Topoi

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In this paper I outline the PAIR account of joint attention as a perceptual-practical, affectively charged intentional relation. I argue that to explain joint attention we need to leave the received understanding of propositions and propositional attitudes and the picture of content connected to it behind and embrace the notions of subject mode and position mode content. I also explore the relation between joint attention and communication.

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WINNER OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY PRIZE 2010: The simplicity of mutual knowledge

Cited by 21 publications

References 24 publications

Convergent minds: ostension, inference and Grice's third clause

Convergent minds: ostension, inference and Grice's third clause

Common Ground and Development

Joint Attention: The PAIR Account

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