2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.diin.2019.04.008
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Windows Memory Forensics: Detecting (Un)Intentionally Hidden Injected Code by Examining Page Table Entries

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Cited by 25 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…2) GhostMiner: It is a powerful fileless cryptojacking [76], observed in 2018, with the high-level evasion techniques [77]. GhostMiner exploits WMI objects as a fileless threat routine for a persistent mechanism [78] to mine Monero cryptocurrency (XMR) continuously.…”
Section: A Common Fileless Cryptojacking Malware In the Wildmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2) GhostMiner: It is a powerful fileless cryptojacking [76], observed in 2018, with the high-level evasion techniques [77]. GhostMiner exploits WMI objects as a fileless threat routine for a persistent mechanism [78] to mine Monero cryptocurrency (XMR) continuously.…”
Section: A Common Fileless Cryptojacking Malware In the Wildmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There exists no single system which has the capability to detect all major types of process injection. Current process injection detection tools are not able to cope with the existing injection techniques and fail to reliably reveal existing malware utilizing certain hiding techniques [1].…”
Section: A Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Tahap akuisisi data pada penelitian ini dilakukan secara live forensics, Tahapan akuisisi data secara live forensics mengacu pada penelitian yang dilakukan sebelumnya oleh [12], [13]. Pada penelitian lainnya yang dilakukan oleh [14] dilakukan akuisisi terhadap random access memory windows untuk menemukan user_id dan password.…”
Section: Proses Penguncian Pada Dm-cryptunclassified