Williams, Nietzsche, and the Meaninglessness of Immortality

Moore, A. W.

doi:10.1093/mind/fzl311

Cited by 17 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…G. Gorman University of Southern California USA agorman@usc.edu ENDNOTES 1 This language first appears in Fischer 2009. 2 For examples of those mounting a defense of Williams' position see Moore 2006, Temkin 2008, Burley 2009aand Altshuler 2015. For examples of defenders of meaningful immortal existence see Wisnewski 1985, Chappell 2007, Smuts 2009, Fischer 2009, Bortolotti and Nagasawa 2009, Bruckner 2012, Galloway 2012, Tanyi and Karlander 2013, Fischer and Mitchell-Yellin 2014, and Lauinger 2014.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Williams and the Desirability of Body‐Bound Immortality Revisited

Gorman

2016

European J of Philosophy

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Bernard Williams argues that human mortality is a good thing because living forever would necessarily be intolerably boring. His argument is often attacked for unfoundedly proposing asymmetrical requirements on the desirability of living for mortal and immortal lives. My first aim in this paper is to advance a new interpretation of Williams' argument that avoids these objections, drawing in part on some of his other writings to contextualize it. My second aim is to show how even the best version of his argument only supports a somewhat weaker thesis: it may be possible for some people with certain special psychological features to enjoy an immortal life, but no one has good reason to bet on being such a person.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For examples of those mounting a defense of Williams' position see Moore , Temkin , Burley and Altshuler . For examples of defenders of meaningful immortal existence see Wisnewski , Chappell , Smuts , Fischer , Bortolotti and Nagasawa , Bruckner , Galloway , Tanyi and Karlander , Fischer and Mitchell‐Yellin , and Lauinger .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Williams and the Desirability of Body‐Bound Immortality Revisited

Gorman

2016

European J of Philosophy

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“…The non‐accidental immortals, the ‘serene bastards’ of Wowbagger's envy, have no trouble coping with everlasting life. Adams does not tell us how they manage to cope; which is a pity, because many contemporary philosophers, notably Bernard Williams (1973) and Adrian Moore (2006), see a conceptual problem here. They cannot conceive how anyone could cope with immortality, even in the rather minimal sense of ‘cope’ that Wowbagger manages.…”

Section: Wowbagger the Infinitely Prolongedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Adrian Moore puts it, in his recent re‐presentation of Williams' argument: ‘the conditions that must be satisfied for my life to continue to count as mine militate against the conditions that must be satisfied for it continue to be a life worth living. Conditions of the former kind demand a constancy, and conditions of the latter kind a variety, that cannot be resolved’ (Moore 2006: 314). Briefly: if EM's life remains hers it goes round in circles; if it doesn't go round in circles it ceases to be hers.…”

Section: The Makropoulos Case: Against the Meaningfulness Of Eternmentioning

confidence: 99%