Wild Bodies Don't Need to Perceive, Detect, Capture, or Create Meaning: They ARE Meaning

Jordan, J. Scott; Cialdella, Vincent; Dayer, Alex; Langley, Matthew D.; Stillman, Zachery

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01149

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…At first, glance, this strategy to describe the relationship between human organisms and the cognitive niche in terms of reciprocal coupling bears interesting similarities to wild systems theory ( Jordan and Vinson, 2012 ; Jordan, 2013 ; Jordan and Day, 2015 ; Jordan et al, 2017 ). 3 This theory “conceptualizes bodies as self-sustaining, multi-scale embodiments of the phylogenetic, cultural, and ontogenetic contexts in which they emerged and in which they sustain themselves” ( Jordan and Vinson, 2012 , p. 7; italics in original).…”

Section: Toward a New Conceptual Framework For Investigating Spontanementioning

confidence: 91%

“…Wild systems theory proposes a nature hypothesis that is connected to a knowledge hypothesis about empirical and theoretical research on wild systems . Wild systems theory proposes an “ ontology of ubiquitous, multi-scale relationality” that seamlessly links embodied organisms and their current physical and socio-cultural contexts ( Jordan et al, 2017 , p. 2; emphasis added). For this reason, wild systems theory “renders properties that had been historically associated with the subjective, such as phenomenology, value, and meaning […] constitutive of what organisms are ” ( Jordan and Day, 2015 , p. 19; emphasis added).…”

Section: Toward a New Conceptual Framework For Investigating Spontanementioning

confidence: 99%

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Spontaneous Cognition and Epistemic Agency in the Cognitive Niche

Fabry

2018

Front. Psychol.

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According to Thomas Metzinger, many human cognitive processes in the waking state are spontaneous and are deprived of the experience of epistemic agency. He considers mind wandering as a paradigm example of our recurring loss of epistemic agency. I will enrich this view by extending the scope of the concept of epistemic agency to include cases of depressive rumination and creative cognition, which are additional types of spontaneous cognition. Like mind wandering, they are characterized by unique phenomenal and functional properties that give rise to varying degrees of epistemic agency. The main claim of this paper will be that the experience of being an epistemic agent within a certain time frame is a relational phenomenon that emerges from the organism’s capacity to interact with its cognitive niche. To explore this relation, I develop a new framework that integrates phenomenological considerations on epistemic agency with a functional account of the reciprocal coupling of the embodied organism with its cognitive niche. This account rests upon dynamical accounts of strong embodied and embedded cognition and recent work on cognitive niche construction. Importantly, epistemic agency and organism-niche coupling are gradual phenomena ranging from weak to strong realizations. The emerging framework will be employed to analyze mind wandering, depressive rumination, and creative cognition as well as their commonalities and differences. Mind wandering and depressive rumination are cases of weak epistemic agency and organism-niche coupling. However, there are also important phenomenological, functional, and neuronal differences. In contrast, creative cognition is a case of strong epistemic agency and organism-niche coupling. By providing a phenomenological and functional analysis of these distinct types of spontaneous cognition, we can gain a better understanding of the importance of organism-niche interaction for the realization of epistemic agency.

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Section: Toward a New Conceptual Framework For Investigating Spontanementioning

confidence: 91%

Section: Toward a New Conceptual Framework For Investigating Spontanementioning

confidence: 99%

Spontaneous Cognition and Epistemic Agency in the Cognitive Niche

Fabry

2018

Front. Psychol.

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“…2007Atmanspacher (e.g. , 2015, Jordan & Ghin (2006) and Jordan et al (2017) -although with interesting differences of emphasis and detail there is not space to go into here.…”

Section: The Reality Of Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The metaphysics of perception: enactivism, phenomenology and information.

Rose¹

2021

Preprint

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Enactivism is a major research programme in the philosophy of perception. Yet its metaphysical status is unclear, since it is claimed to avoid both idealism and realism yet still has aspects of both within it. One attempt to solve this conundrum is based on the fusion of enactivism with phenomenology and the mathematical concept of symmetry breaking (Moss Brender, 2013). I suggest this is not entirely successful and propose it needs the addition of a multi-level, non-reductive metaphysics (for example, Informational Structural Realism). The processes we commonly call ‘perception’ are causal transfers of information at certain levels in the hierarchy of meaningful structures that comprise physical reality. Phenomenologists could use the word ‘perception’ metaphorically across all levels, although realists need not do so.

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“…James Gibson’s (1979/1986) concept of affordances has been widely discussed and debated in recent years, (e.g., Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014 ; Rietveld et al, 2016 ; van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017 ; Withagen et al, 2017 ; Jordan et al, 2017 ). The widespread consensus contains the idea that affordances are relational ‘concepts’ combining features of the environment with individual effectivities , perceived on the basis of what they offer, invite or demand for an individual in terms of action possibilities.…”

Section: Ecological Dynamics Enhances Understanding Of Extreme Sportsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is, as ways for humans to engage with the environing world and as mediums to explore physical or psychological capacities and, ultimately, what it means to be a human. Therefore, rather than a causal property of innate need, personality trait or any other single entity or component within the person-environment system, the extreme sport experience can be seen as a pure embodiment of the context, i.e., the composition of interacting, omnipresent and intertwined constraints ( Jordan et al, 2017 ).…”

Section: New Definition For Extreme Sports As Guided By Phenomenologymentioning

confidence: 99%

An Ecological Conceptualization of Extreme Sports

et al. 2018

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Currently, there are various definitions for extreme sports and researchers in the field have been unable to advance a consensus on what exactly constitutes an ‘extreme’ sport. Traditional theory-led explanations, such as edgeworks, sensation seeking and psychoanalysis, have led to inadequate conceptions. These frameworks have failed to capture the depth and nuances of experiences of individuals who refute the notions of risk-taking, adrenaline- and thrill-seeking or death-defiance. Instead, participants are reported to describe experiences as positive, deeply meaningful and life-enhancing. The constant evolution of emerging participation styles and philosophies, expressed within and across distinguishable extreme sport niches, or forms of life, and confusingly dissimilar definitions and explanations, indicate that, to better understand cognitions, perceptions and actions of extreme sport participants, a different level of analysis to traditional approaches needs to be emphasized. This paper develops the claim that a more effective definition, reflecting the phenomenology, and framework of an ecological dynamics rationale, can significantly advance the development of a more comprehensive and nuanced future direction for research and practice. Practical implications of such a rationale include study designs, representative experimental analyses and developments in coaching practices and pedagogical approaches in extreme sports. Our position statement suggests that extreme sports are more effectively defined as emergent forms of action and adventure sports, consisting of an inimitable person-environment relationship with exquisite affordances for ultimate perception and movement experiences, leading to existential reflection and self-actualization as framed by the human form of life.

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Wild Bodies Don't Need to Perceive, Detect, Capture, or Create Meaning: They ARE Meaning

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

Spontaneous Cognition and Epistemic Agency in the Cognitive Niche

Spontaneous Cognition and Epistemic Agency in the Cognitive Niche

The metaphysics of perception: enactivism, phenomenology and information.

An Ecological Conceptualization of Extreme Sports

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