WiFi access point pricing as a dynamic game

Musacchio, John; Walrand, Jean

doi:10.1109/tnet.2006.872553

Cited by 85 publications

(108 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…However, users' utilities also depends on how much web browsing they do [14]. Define V t of the time devoted to it [15], independent of the user [8].…”

Section: ) User Utilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For small increases in the average streaming time, the increase in video streaming time by those who remain in tier 2 outweighs the very small reduction in tier 2 subscriptions and performance, and hence results in an increase in traffic. As a result, the engineering department increases capacity μ according to (14). However, for larger increases in video streaming time, the tier 2 subscriptions and performance begin to drop quickly, outweighing the increase in video streaming time by those who remain in tier 2, and hence resulting in a decrease in traffic, and thus a decrease in capacity.…”

Section: B Variation Of the Design With Key Parametersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Modeling ISP tier design

Dai

Jordan

2013

Proceedings of the 2013 25th International Teletraffic Congress (ITC)

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Abstract-We model how Internet Service Providers design tier rates, tier prices, and network capacity. Web browsing and video streaming are considered as the two dominant Internet applications. We propose a novel set of utility functions that depend on a user's willingness to pay for each application, the performance of each application, and the time devoted to each application. For a monopoly provider, the demand function for each tier is derived as a function of tier price and performance. We first give conditions for the tier rates, tier prices, and network capacity that maximize Internet Service Provider profit, defined as subscription revenue minus capacity cost. We then show how an Internet Service Provider may simplify tier and capacity design, by allowing their engineering department to set network capacity, their marketing department to set tier prices, and both to jointly set tier rates. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the magnitude of the decrease in profit resulting from such a simplified design.

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“…However, users' utilities also depends on how much web browsing they do [14]. Define V t of the time devoted to it [15], independent of the user [8].…”

Section: ) User Utilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Variation Of the Design With Key Parametersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling ISP tier design

Dai

Jordan

2013

Proceedings of the 2013 25th International Teletraffic Congress (ITC)

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“…Equations (16) and (17), together with x i = J j=1 q ij c ij are equivalent to equations (9)- (11) and (13). Furthermore, for a demand vector to be a subgame perfect equilibrium of the provider competition game, it is required that the demand each provider is facing equals to the supply, i.e.…”

Section: Appendix B Proof Of Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The related research in the wireless setting can be divided into several categories: optimization-based resource allocation of one provider (e.g., [9]- [13]), game theoretical interactions between the users of one provider (e.g., [14]- [16]), competition of different service providers on behalf of the users (e.g., [17], [18]), and providers' price competition to attract users (e.g., [19]- [26]). Our current work falls into the last category.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We refer to equations (9)- (13) collectively as the KKT conditions, and say that any maximizing solution q must satisfy the KKT conditions for some Lagrange multiplier vector p. Furthermore, any vector q that satisfies the KKT conditions for some p is a maximizing vector of NUM. Using the Lagrange multipliers, let us define J i (p) = {j ∈ J : pj cij = min k∈J p k c ik } for all i ∈ I (in Section IV this is the definition of the preference set of user i given prices p, while here the sets are defined based on Lagrange multipliers).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Competition of wireless providers for atomic users: Equilibrium and social optimality

Gajic

Huang

Rimoldi

2009

2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)

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Abstract-We study a problem where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous and atomic (non-infinitesimal) wireless users. The users differ in their utility functions as well as in the perceived quality of service of individual providers. We model the interaction of an arbitrary number of providers and users as a two-stage multi-leader-follower game, and prove existence and uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a generic channel model and a wide class of users' utility functions. We show that, interestingly, the competition of resource providers leads to a globally optimal outcome under fairly general technical conditions. Our results show that some users need to purchase their resource from several providers at the equilibrium. While the number of such users is typically small (smaller than the number of providers), our simulations indicate that the percentage of cases where at least one undecided user exists can be significant.

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