Wide and narrow scope

Shpall, Sam

doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9841-z

Cited by 18 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Shpall (2013). 33 In particular, this proposal follows many of the ideas regarding how to set up deontic structure laid out in Feldman (1986), chapter 2.…”

Section: The Narrow Vs Wide Scope Question: Assessing the Answersmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…And, as we'll see, these two answers will have importantly different implications. 28 For some of the recent literature bearing on this issue, see Broome (1999), Schroeder (2004, Broome (2007), Kolodny (2007), Bedke (2009), Brunero (2010, Way (2011), Brunero (2012, Lord (2013), Shpall (2013), and Titelbaum (forthcoming).…”

Section: The Narrow Vs Wide Scope Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But everyone calls norms of the form A → O(C) narrow scope, and norms of the form O(A → C) wide scope, so we can skirt these complications here. 31 For discussions of these kinds of symmetry arguments, see Way (2011), Brunero (2012, Lord (2013) and Shpall (2013). 32 In the text, I focus on worries regarding whether the narrow answer has the right normative profile.…”

Section: The Narrow Vs Wide Scope Question: Assessing the Answersmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Understanding Conditionalization

Meacham

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…Shpall (2013). 33 In particular, this proposal follows many of the ideas regarding how to set up deontic structure laid out in Feldman (1986), chapter 2.…”

Section: The Narrow Vs Wide Scope Question: Assessing the Answersmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: The Narrow Vs Wide Scope Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Narrow Vs Wide Scope Question: Assessing the Answersmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Understanding Conditionalization

Meacham

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…The absence of an intention to X is certainly not (conclusive) evidence of its not being the case that you ought to X. I will therefore not include (N*) in my discussion. 6 See in particular Broome (1999Broome ( , 2004Broome ( , 2007aBroome ( , 2007bBroome ( , and 2013a, Brunero (2010Brunero ( , 2012, Kolodny (2005Kolodny ( , 2007a, Rippon (2011), Schroder (2004, Shpall (2013), and Way (2010Way ( , 2011. 7 Suppose you believe you ought to X, but you have no intention of X-ing.…”

Section: Advancing the Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

“…18 Compare, for example, Broome (1999Broome ( , 2007aBroome ( , 2013a, Brunero (2010Brunero ( , 2012, Evers (2011), Kolodny (2007b, Rippon (2011), Shpall (2013), and Way (2010 (LR) constrains a code as follows: suppose that, at w, q is among the rationally required propositions. Then, at w, r is also among the rationally required propositions.…”

Section: A Counterexamplementioning

confidence: 99%

The property of rationality: a guide to what rationality requires?

Fink

2017

Philos Stud

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Abstract. Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome's work on rational requirements, the answer is 'no' -at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by replacing a wide-scope requirement with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa), we do not alter the situations in which a person is fully rational. As a consequence, (iii) the property of full rationality is unable to guide us in determining whether a rational requirement has a wide or a narrow logical scope. We cannot resolve the wide/narrow scope debate by appealing to a theory of fully rational attitudes. This paper argues that (i), (ii) and (iii) are incorrect. Replacing a wide-with a corresponding narrow-scope requirement (or vice versa) can alter the set of circumstances in which a person is fully rational. The property of full rationality is therefore not independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. As a consequence, the property of full rationality can guide us in determining what rationality requires -even in cases where we expect a precise answer.

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Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists

Toppinen

2017

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Wide and narrow scope

Cited by 18 publications

References 25 publications

Understanding Conditionalization

Understanding Conditionalization

The property of rationality: a guide to what rationality requires?

Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists

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