Why Village Election Has Not Much Improved Village Governance

Abstract

Village elections have been implemented throughout China for more than a decade. Much improvement has been made in the institutionalization of village elections. However, village election is widely viewed as producing little effect on village governance. What has been perceived as electoral achievement has yet to be translated into improving the way villages are governed. Why has village election remained largely irrelevant to effective village self-government? This paper intends to answer the question by examining some causal factors responsible for ineffective village governance. Specifically, this paper looks at the dysfunctional village governance structure, township re-assertiveness over villages, and the village dualleadership factor. This paper proposes a new governing model that incorporates major village players to ensure that village elections will lead to effective village governance in the countryside.Democratic election is generally believed to be closely linked to responsive governance, although it does not necessarily have a causal-effect relationship. Much of it depends also on other institutional and cultural factors such as legal systems and civic culture. Village elections have been implemented throughout China for more than a decade. Much improvement has been made in the institutionalization of village elections. Village elections have now been conducted regularly every three years, and villagers' awareness of democratic rights and election rules have been enhanced with each round of village elections.However, village election is widely viewed as producing little effect on village governance. What has been perceived as electoral achievement has yet to be J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2010) 15:153-167

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