2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.020
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Why trust out-groups? The role of punishment under uncertainty

Abstract: We conducted a hidden-effort trust game, in which we assigned subjects to one of two groups. The groups, which were formed through two different group formation processes, included a "social" group that required sharing and exchange among its members, and a "non-social" group that did not. Once assigned, subjects participated in the game with members from both groups, either with or without the opportunity to punish a trustee who may have defected on them. We found that for investors in the non-social group, t… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 49 publications
(53 reference statements)
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“…This hypothesis is plausible because coercive power can be used by customers to induce fear among service workers. Because fear substantially affects behavioral intentions (Pan and Houser, 2019), customer coercive power may lead to changes in life insurance salespeople's whistleblowing intentions. Furthermore, service workers fear reporting customer sexual harassment behaviors because of possible customer retaliation (Hughes and Tadic, 1998;Fine et al, 1999).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This hypothesis is plausible because coercive power can be used by customers to induce fear among service workers. Because fear substantially affects behavioral intentions (Pan and Houser, 2019), customer coercive power may lead to changes in life insurance salespeople's whistleblowing intentions. Furthermore, service workers fear reporting customer sexual harassment behaviors because of possible customer retaliation (Hughes and Tadic, 1998;Fine et al, 1999).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This leads us to hypothesize that the in-group orientation of collectivist societies constrains charitable giving compared to individualistic societies. And giving derived from in-group orientation is not precluded by individualism (see, by way of comparison, Pan and Houser 2019 ). Munger (2015) and Ealy (2014) , invoking Polanyi ([1946] 2013 ), argue that the core of charitable giving is allowing individuals to form their own associations, leveraging their knowledge, connections, and talents.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%