Why the CCM won't lose: the roots of single-party dominance in Tanzania

O’Gorman, Melanie

doi:10.1080/02589001.2012.669566

Cited by 18 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…This finding is line with other research showing improvements in service delivery in Tanzania driven by electoral politics during this period (Weinstein, 2011;Rosenzweig, 2015). What is more interesting, however, is that, whereas some research has suggested that the rural and redistributive leaning reflected in the promises made by the CCM during elections is mere rhetoric in order to win votes, only to be forgotten during implementation afterwards (O'Gorman, 2012;Kjaer and Therkildsen, 2012), this may no longer be the case. Studies have shown that the wealthier urban segments of the population benefited most when reforms were introduced in the early 1990s (Morrisson, 2002;Mbekeani, 2009;Bech et al, 2013).…”

Section: Discussion: the Future Of Health Insurances In A Changing Posupporting

confidence: 86%

Social Protection in an Electorally Competitive Environment (2): The Politics of Health Insurance in Tanzania

Pedersen

Jacob

2018

SSRN Journal

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This paper analyses the introduction and expansion of health insurance schemes in Tanzania. Health insurances were introduced around year 2000 as part of a more general health reform process aimed at improving access to health services. The paper argues that the health insurances were driven by a policy coalition of bureaucrats and transnational actors, who, inspired by international trends, framed reforms as a way for the ruling party to live up to one of its core priorities since independence, namely, improved and, eventually, universal access to health services. The introduction of insurances was expected to help mobilise funds and improve the working of the health care system for this purpose. However, judged by their modest design and slow implementation, the ruling political elite remained ambiguous about health insurances. Politically, a fast rollout was perceived to be risky. Similar political considerations may explain the reluctance to expand health insurance coverage through a mandatory scheme that bureaucrats and development partners have propagated recently. The rejection of the initial design for such a scheme came as a surprise to the policy coalition, which did not enjoy the same access to key decisionmakers as in the past. Concurrently, and driven by increased electoral competition, the ruling party has increasingly focused on improving access through the expansion of physical health infrastructure. This has the additional advantage of being highly visible among the rural majority of the population, who overwhelmingly vote Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). This is our second paper on social protection in Tanzania.

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Section: Discussion: the Future Of Health Insurances In A Changing Posupporting

confidence: 86%

Social Protection in an Electorally Competitive Environment (2): The Politics of Health Insurance in Tanzania

Pedersen

Jacob

2018

SSRN Journal

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“…The latest Afribarometer published in 2018 shows that of the 66 percent of Tanzanians who feel close to a party, 51 percent feel close to the CCM, with Chadema in second place, at only 11 percent (see REPOA and Afribarometer, 2018). Most of this 51 percent live in rural areas, confirming the 'inherent loyalty' in the countryside identified by O'Gorman in her survey and article on single-party dominance in Tanzania (O'Gorman, 2012). CCM has also won almost all by-elections since 2015, though rarely on a level playing field with the opposition, which complains about harassment and violent attacks.…”

Section: Reshaping the Political Settlement Under Post-liberalisation: Vying For The Rural Constituencymentioning

confidence: 56%

“…Some scholars have suggested that the preference for the conspicuous construction of infrastructure based on promises made by the CCM during elections was mere rhetoric, in order to win votes, only to be forgotten during implementation (O'Gorman, 2012;Kjaer and Therkildsen, 2012). It has also been pointed out that the mode of implementation through community-driven projects provided local political leaders and bureaucrats, who were still overwhelmingly CCM members, a platform permitting semi-formalised forms of patronage that were useful at election times (Kelsall et al, 2005).…”

Section: Shifting Policy Agendas As Responses To Crises Of Elite Legitimacy Under Liberalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Settlement and the Politics of Legitimation in Countries Undergoing Democratisation: Insights From Tanzania

Pedersen

Jacob

2019

SSRN Journal

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In recent decades, reforms have been introduced in developing countries to promote economic transformation, democracy and the rule of law. However, structural factors have often undermined their implementation. This is a key insight of the political settlement analysis that has proliferated in scholarly research. Its unpacking of the sorts of intra-elite relations that are instrumental in choosing policies and their modes of implementation is a major achievement. However, with its focus on hard force and economic rents, it is less clear regarding the role of elections and popular legitimacy, which have become more important recently. Inspired by an adapted political settlement analysis, and by drawing on the strategic-relational approach, this paper aims to explain contemporary forms of power and legitimacy in greater detail. Using Tanzania -which has had the same party in power since independence -as a critical case study, we demonstrate that, in the context of democratisation, the country's political elites are increasingly attempting to earn popular legitimacy. In Tanzania, earlier attempts to earn popular legitimacy through the expansion of social services to the rural majority were radicalised when a new president came to power in 2015. During the historically competitive elections, he campaigned on a platform of reversing years of domination by business and political elites. He later crafted a series of nationalist narratives and attacks on private investors, not least foreign ones, to bolster his legitimacy in the eyes of the wider population. This implies a more prominent role for populations in developing countries than is often acknowledged. We also suggest that, in the context of democratisation, analyses of legitimacy should include two more dimensions: first, a political elite's relationship with its political opponents, who in Tanzania have been systematically delegitimised; and secondly, international recognition, which since the 1980s has required the holding of regular elections and is important for resource mobilisation. We therefore argue that legitimacy should be analysed as a source of power in its own right, in line with force and rents; it is the combination of these different sources of power that matters.

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“…In that sense, political order did not die out with the death of the father of independence but found a continuation in the party. Moreover, ordinary people still link the party to positive aspects such as national unity and a pro-poor and pro-rural image (O’Gorman, 2012). A presidential two-term limit was introduced in 1977 and has since been respected.…”

Section: Case Studies and Comparative Meritmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidential Term Limits and Regime Types: When Do Leaders Respect Constitutional Norms?

Osei

Akinocho²,

Mwombela

2020

Africa Spectrum

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Why do some leaders respect constitutional provisions like presidential term limits, while others do not? For all regimes, constitutions are important reference texts that provide some basic rules of the game. Within this framework, term limits and electoral laws are crucial because they are directly concerned with the exercise of power. Using Geddes’ regime typology, this article is proposing a regime-oriented approach to explain the variation on the African continent. Democracies, party-based regimes, and military regimes are surely different from each other, but they have a degree of depersonalisation in common that is not found in personalist regimes. For the latter type, term limits are a question of regime survival. Personalist rulers will therefore seek to amend or ignore constitutions, but their success will depend on the cohesion of their ruling coalition. The argument will be illustrated with two case studies: Togo and Tanzania.

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Why the CCM won't lose: the roots of single-party dominance in Tanzania

Cited by 18 publications

References 40 publications

Social Protection in an Electorally Competitive Environment (2): The Politics of Health Insurance in Tanzania

Social Protection in an Electorally Competitive Environment (2): The Politics of Health Insurance in Tanzania

Political Settlement and the Politics of Legitimation in Countries Undergoing Democratisation: Insights From Tanzania

Presidential Term Limits and Regime Types: When Do Leaders Respect Constitutional Norms?

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