Why Terrorism Does Not Work

Abstract

This is the first article to analyze a large sample of terrorist groups in terms of their policy effectiveness. It includes every foreign terrorist organization (FTO) designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001. The key variable for FTO success is a tactical one: target selection. Terrorist groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumber attacks on military targets do not tend to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature. Contrary to the prevailing view that terrorism is an effective means of political coercion, the universe of cases suggests that, first, contemporary terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives and, second, the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself. The bulk of the article develops a theory for why countries are reluctant to make policy concessions when their civilian populations are the primary target.

Discussing Concepts of Terrorist Rationality: Implications for Counterterrorism Policy

“…Effectiveness and instrumental rationality of terrorist action is, however, challenged by various scholars, including Abrahms (2004Abrahms ( , 2006Abrahms ( , 2008, Jenkins (2006) and Gupta (2008a).…”

Foreign policies or culture

“…In their search for possible correlates of public opinion on terrorism and suicide attacks, Bueno de Mesquita (2007), Fair & Shepherd (2006), Mousseau (2011) As the following analysis of less ambiguous dependent variables clearly shows, this question fails to specify whether the respondent is supposed to think of attacks on US troops in Afghanistan which would fall under the definition of guerrilla war, or whether to think of attacks on US civilians in the United States which would fall under most definitions of terrorism (Abrahms 2006;Wight, 2009;Hoffman, 2006 This present paper circumvents these problems by using the answer to a questionnaire item that eschews ambiguous cues (table II):…”

Reading anonymity: Narrative difference and framework selection in the claiming of terrorist violence

“…Risk of erroneous communications or interpretations by the media may lead to a loss of support for the terrorist group (Abrahms 2006). Due to the eventoriented and for-profit nature of the media (Rorie, 2008, p.10), publicity of a terrorist act may cover tactics used and their fallout but is unlikely to review the conditions that precipitated the attack (Altheide 1987).…”