Why studying plant cognition is valuable, even if plants aren’t cognitive

Abstract

Philosophers and scientists propose the idea that plants are cognitive, which has been met with criticisms. These criticisms focus on the fact that plants do not possess the properties traditionally associated with cognition. By contrast, several proponents introduce novel ways to conceptualize cognition. How should we make sense of this debate? In this paper, I argue that the plant cognition debate is not about whether plants meet a set of well-delineated and agreed-upon criteria according to which they count as cognitive. Rather, many proponents are hypothesizing about cognition. They construe COGNITION not as an expression of what cognition is, but rather as a conjecture about what cognition might be. These conjectures orient research that can uncover novel similarities amongst the phenomena to which these concepts extend. In defending this view, I argue that investigating plant cognition is valuable, even if the results of these investigations lead us to reject the claim that plants are cognitive.

De-Humanizing Cognition, Intelligence, and Agency. A Critical Assessment Between Philosophy, Ethics, and Science

“…However, the reality of philosophy and cognitive science is quite different. As Colaço (2022) observes, the debate on COGNITION and 1 Following other authors, I use capital letters to refer to the concept of cognition.…”

“…From the practical point of view, maybe it is even alright, as Allen (2017) suggests, if COGNITION is not strictly defined at all. I am also sympathetic to the pluralistic idea of various definitions of COGNITION as (Colaço 2022). My only philosophical constraint is that we should think of COGNITION as a story that needs to be told in whole, from the beginning to where it is now, with the awareness that it is not ending with us.…”

A critical review of plant sentience: moving beyond traditional approaches

“…Some have argued that we should refrain from trying to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for cognition, claiming that cognition is not a natural kind (Allen 2017). Others argue that, instead of discussing whether plants fit into a certain definition of cognition we should treat the debate on plant cognition as being one of hypothesising about what cognition might be (Colaço, 2022). Further still, Lee (2023) argues that we should refrain from dichotomous thinking, such as demanding that plants either are or are not cognitive agents and instead adopt a degrees view of cognition whereby plants satisfy some aspects of cognition to some degree.…”

Decision Making in Plants: A Rooted Perspective

“…A related worry stemming from a 'cognitivist' approach is that any genuine cognitive ability must be underwritten by a representational process [24,25]. Hence, for non-neural organisms to make genuine choices in the same (cognitive) sense, it is necessary for them to trade in representations.…”