2009
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1341771
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Why SPAC Investors Should Listen to the Market

Abstract: Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) have raised around $22bn from investors since 2003, and comprised 20% of total funds raised in US IPOs in 2007. SPACs are interesting structures-allowing investors a risk-free option to invest in a future acquisition. However, we show that more than one-half of approved deals immediately destroy value. Investors, who can observe the market's view of the proposed deal, as well as that of the founders, should listen to the market, since the extreme incentives faced b… Show more

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Cited by 29 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…First, we document the abnormal returns for all three SPAC securities around important days in their life, with owners of SPAC warrants experiencing the strongest one day abnormal return. Second, we do not find that SPAC mergers were value destroying as reported in Jenkinson and Sousa (2009). We confirm findings in previous studies and show that SPACs do not experience underpricing at the day of the IPO opposite to the findings in the IPO literature.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 89%
“…First, we document the abnormal returns for all three SPAC securities around important days in their life, with owners of SPAC warrants experiencing the strongest one day abnormal return. Second, we do not find that SPAC mergers were value destroying as reported in Jenkinson and Sousa (2009). We confirm findings in previous studies and show that SPACs do not experience underpricing at the day of the IPO opposite to the findings in the IPO literature.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 89%
“…Following Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) GoodSPAC is defined as one priced in the market at the level above trust value of share at the merger date and 54% of SPACs in the sample satisfy that requirement.…”
Section: Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 Lewellen(2009), Thompson (2010) confirm the lack of underpricing for SPACs entering financial markets in the U.S. Ignatyeva, Rauch, and Wahrenburg (2012) find no underpricing in the sample of European SPACs. Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) report that half of the SPACs are value destroying. 5 Notable exception is Rodrigues and Stegemoller (2012) Observing unique set of specified purpose companies this paper documents that SPACs' failure rate is at the level of 58.09%, higher than any previously reported failure rate in the post-IPO survival literature, and comparable only to Hensler et al (1997) failure rates of 55.10% for general companies.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the AIM, the Investment Companies can be considered equivalent to the CPC, although they must raise a minimum of £3 million in cash. In the U.S., the Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are similar to CPCs, but for large transactions (Berger, 2008;Jenkinson and Sousa, 2009).…”
Section: The Small Business Advocates" Perspectivementioning
confidence: 99%