Why Should We Study Experience More Systematically: Neurophenomenology and Modern Cognitive Science

Abstract

In the article I will defend the view that cognitive science needs to use first-and second-person methods more systematically, as part of everyday research practice, if it wants to understand the human mind in its full scope. Neurophenomenological programme proposed by Varela as a remedy for the hard problem of consciousness (i.e. the problem of experience) does not solve it on the ontological level. Nevertheless, it represents a good starting point of how to tackle the phenomenon of experience in a more systematic, methodologically sound way. On the other hand, Varela's criterion of phenomenological reduction as a necessary condition for systematic investigation of experience is too strong. Regardless of that and some other problems that research of experience faces (e.g. the problem of training, the question of what kind of participants we want to study), it is becoming clear that investigating experience seriously -from first-and second-person perspective -is a necessary step cognitive science must take. This holds especially when researching phenomena that involve consciousness and/or where differentiation between conscious and unconscious processing is crucial. Furthermore, gathering experiential data is essential for interpreting experimental results gained purely by quantitative methods -especially when we are implicitly or explicitly referring to experience in our conclusions and interpretations. To support these claims some examples from the broader area of decision making will be given (the effect of deliberation-without-attention, cognitive reflection test).

The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Neurophenomenology – The Case of Studying Self Boundaries With Meditators

“…What is NP Varela, 1996;Lutz, 2002Lutz, , 2007Lutz and Thompson, 2003;Rudrauf et al, 2003;Thompson, 2006 'Front-loading' phenomenology into experimental design Gallagher and Sørensen, 2006 Neurofeedback useful for NP Bagdasaryan and Le Van Quyen, 2013 Hypnosis useful for NP Lifshitz et al, 2013 Astronaut simulation and challenges of NP Bockelman et al, 2013 Dreams and challenges of NP Solomonova et al, 2014 Kantian perspective on NP Khachouf et al, 2013 NP in the context of in dyadic movement Stuart, 2013 Application of NP in affective neuroscience Colombetti, 2013 NP usefulness in psychology Gordon, 2013 NP usefulness in ECoG Petitmengin and Lachaux, 2013 NP justification in practice Strle, 2013 Philosophical attack and justification Bitbol and Antonova, 2016;Kirchhoff and Hutto, 2016 Advantage of training scientists in contemplation Desbordes and Negi, 2013 NP applied to time consciousness Varela, 1999 NP usefulness in pain Price et al, 2002 Combining descriptive experience sampling with 3P Hurlburt et al, 2017 Combining 2P methods Froese et al, 2011;Olivares et al, 2015 Philosophical roots of NP and enaction Vörös et al, 2016 An externalist extension of NP Beaton, 2013 Adding a cardiac-affective dimension to NP Depraz and Desmidt, 2018 Distinguishing mild vs. radical NP Petitmengin, 2017 The feasibility of NP Ataria, 2017 Neurofeedback useful for NP Bielas and Michalczyk, 2017 NP usefulness to understand trauma Ataria et al, 2019 Application of NP to microdreams Nielsen, 2017 Phenomenological matrix of mindfulness Lut...…”

Parallels between Mindfulness and First-person Research into Consciousness

“…If we give up interpreting experience and comparing it to third-person data, then these problems become irrelevant. In the same vein we can also deal with any questions that arise about the limited scope of introspective methods, as it is fairly obvious that all of these are in fact questions about the compatibility of such methods with third-person behavioural-physiological theories of the mind (see also Strle 2013). But if we attempt to view the experiential landscape as primary, as suggested by Husserl, than the "outside" objective world can no longer be the frame of reference for the validity of experiential data.…”