2015
DOI: 10.1111/pafo.12039
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Why China's Leaders Benefit from a Nuclear, Threatening North Korea: Preempting and Diverting Opposition at Home and Abroad

Abstract: Since the Soviet Union's collapse and North Korea's subsequent deep economic crisis, China's economic and diplomatic support has been vital to the Northern regime's survival. Why has China provided this support? In foreign policy‐making, China's post‐Deng leaders have increasingly prioritized domestic politics over national interests. This implies that China's leaders are likely to view the North's nuclearization, proliferation efforts, and controlled provocations as increasingly beneficial – as long as these … Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(1 citation statement)
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References 14 publications
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“…Moreover, the resolution still allows China to export oil to North Korea and to trade at their border regions, which leaves room for the regime's survival (Lou, 2016). With an ambiguous stance on North Korean affairs, China seems to believe that preserving the North's nuclear program will eventually benefit themselves (Horowitz, 2015). Accordingly, the Council's sanctions on North Korea did not have a noticeable impact on its trade with China (Noland, 2009) and not much change has been observed in North Korea's hostile behavior.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, the resolution still allows China to export oil to North Korea and to trade at their border regions, which leaves room for the regime's survival (Lou, 2016). With an ambiguous stance on North Korean affairs, China seems to believe that preserving the North's nuclear program will eventually benefit themselves (Horowitz, 2015). Accordingly, the Council's sanctions on North Korea did not have a noticeable impact on its trade with China (Noland, 2009) and not much change has been observed in North Korea's hostile behavior.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%