Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making?

Holler, Manfred J.; Widgrén, Mika

doi:10.1177/0951692899011003003

Cited by 43 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…According to Lane Second, while the figures given in [7] are those for [relative] I-power, measured by the Bz index, the criticism in [3] treats them as though they were values of an index of P-power, and applies the criterion of our inequality (5) in Section 3 to imply that the Medbloc would be disadvantageous. This is another fallacy against which we warned in the beginning of Section 4.…”

Section: Expedient Blocs In the Cmecmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?

Felsenthal¹,

Machover²

2002

Soc Choice Welfare

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This is an electronic version of an Article published inWe also distinguish between blocs imposed by annexation and those formed voluntarily, and present some general theoretical results concerning these notions. We illustrate our theoretical findings with examples using both toy SVGs and the Qualified Majority Voting rule of the Council of Ministers of the European Community (CMEC). We show that when voting power is understood as influence (I-power), forming a voluntary bloc may be advantageous even if its voting power is smaller than the sum of the original powers of its members; and it may be disadvantageous even if its voting power is greater than that sum.

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Section: Expedient Blocs In the Cmecmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[1, Com. 2.2.3] and references cited there; see also [2], [5] and [6].) Of course, in reality when deciding whether to form a bloc, voters will take into account the kind of information that we ignore here, in so far as it is available.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?

Felsenthal¹,

Machover²

2002

Soc Choice Welfare

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“…A useful discussion of power indices that focuses on how they have been used in political science is provided by Riker (1992). For critiques and responses on the use of power indices, see Morriss (1996), Garrett and McLean (1996), Garrett, McLean and Machover (1995), Tsebelis and Garrett (1996), Garrett and Tsebelis (1996;1999a;1999b), Holler and Widgren (1999), Lane and Berg (1999) and Johnston (1996;1995a, 1995b. For more formal critiques see Felsenthal and Machover (1995; and .…”

Section: Measuring Voting Powermentioning

confidence: 98%

Regionalizing Multilateralism: Estimating the Power of Potential Regional Voting Blocs in the IMF

Strand

Rapkin

2005

International Interactions

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This paper explores the voting power of hypothetical regional voting blocs in the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund. We first discuss the prospect of regionally defined groups becoming more significant in the Fund's decision-making process. After briefly outlining the IMF's formal decision procedures, including its weighted voting system, use of special majorities, and the function of voting groups in the Fund's Executive Board we define three indices of a priori voting power -the Banzhaf, Johnston, and Shapley-Shubik indices -which are then applied to existing voting groups. Following this we simulate several regionally defined a priori coalitions and their potential to influence outcomes in passing resolutions in the Fund using a simple majority. The coalitions we specify are based on the assumption that members of the IMF will form into voting blocs based on regionally-defined preferences. The procedures employed use existing voting weights to project the relative strengths of alternative regional blocs that could emerge within the IMF. Our results indicate that the United States would have the greatest voting power in almost all scenarios. A voting bloc comprised of European countries, however, would be able to dominate the United States unless the U.S.We have benefited from the comments of three anonymous referees. We also thank Thomas Bräuninger for modifying his source code to accommodate our application of the ShapleyShubik and Banzhaf indices.

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“…There is some methodological controversy about whether the use of power indices is an appropriate procedure to analyse the power in the Council of Ministers (see e.g. Tsebelis andGarett, 1996 or Holler andWidgren, 1999 Felsenthal and Machover (1998).…”

Section: Net Annual Economic and Political Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

To Wait or Not to Wait: Swiss EU-Membership as an Investment under Uncertainty

Spirig

Weder

2008

Swiss J Economics Statistics

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Summary Why do some countries join the EU earlier than others, why do others wait? In order to address this question we apply the theory of investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) to the decision on EU-membership. We present the idea in a simplified model of two periods to study how the value of waiting depends among other things on the expected benefits, the degree of uncertainty and the adjustment costs. The approach gives rise to a country’s position to deliberately postpone a membership in order to keep the option to join later if this is desirable. The model, thus, may explain delayed accession to the EU. We apply this framework to Switzerland by quantifying some of the crucial determinants of the value of waiting and qualitatively compare these findings with the experiences of other countries. We find evidence that adjustment costs are relatively high for Switzerland whereas net annual benefits are limited and subject to an increased degree of uncertainty.

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Why Power Indices for Assessing European Union Decision-Making?

Cited by 43 publications

References 9 publications

Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?

Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?

Regionalizing Multilateralism: Estimating the Power of Potential Regional Voting Blocs in the IMF

To Wait or Not to Wait: Swiss EU-Membership as an Investment under Uncertainty

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