Why People Vote: Ethical Motives and Social Incentives

Abstract

Some individuals vote because they are motivated by a civic duty to do so, whereas others may vote because they wish to appear prosocial to others. This paper proposes a simple framework that captures these motivations, and provides results consistent with findings on turnout, e.g., that turnout is responsive to the expected closeness and importance of an election, to the observability of one's choice to vote, and to social rewards and punishments associated with voting. We study various extensions of this framework in which community monitoring plays a role, and explore the implications that voter mobilization has for electoral competition. (JEL D03, D72)

Social Esteem and Participation in Contentious Politics: A Field Experiment at an LGBT Pride Rally

“…Indeed, reducing the material costs of voting does not necessarily boost turnout if the act of voting simultaneously becomes more private (Funk 2010); the deleterious effect of less observable voting on turnout has been found to be more dramatic in smaller communities where the desire for social esteem and incentives to avoid shame are likely to be more acute (Funk 2010). These results are consistent with a model in which individuals derive utility from the high opinion of other members of their social-identity groups even when earning such a high opinion is materially costly (Akerlof and Kranton 2000;Ali and Lin 2013;Benabou and Tirole 2006;DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier 2012).…”

Beyond Bathsheba: Managing Ethical Climates Through Pragmatic Ethics

“…Although Caras and Sandu fail to address the relative utility of expert counsel, they clarify the distinction between performative and pragmatic expertise, which makes a valuable connection between ethical counseling and utility. Ali and Lin (2013) explore pragmatism in voter theory to identify when a rational person would "incur the cost of voting, even when it is improbable that any one of them is pivotal" (Ali & Lin, 2013. p. 73). This gives explanatory power to understanding the potential costs of ethical behavior given inherent inefficiencies in achieving outcomes in intensely competitive environments.…”

“…Specifically, Morgan reinforces philosophical rather than qualitative characteristics of pragmatism "by moving beyond the narrow approaches that reduce pragmatism to practicality" (Morgan, 2014(Morgan, , p. 1045. Similarly, Ali and Lin's (2013) explanation of the impact of audience costs on voting behavior (p. 75) is underscored by Morgan's pragmatic explanation for understanding actions and choices as "not just what researchers do but why they do things the ways they do" (Morgan, 2014(Morgan, , p. 1051. Although Morgan challenges some of the scientific assumptions of pragmatism, the potential for ethical considerations to inform choices remains valid.…”

“…Adding to the complexity of the model are the ideas presented by Ali and Lin (2013) where the probability of being exposed for engaging in bad leader behavior adds to the utility of a rational choice. For ~E, there is a probability of getting caught (P) and not getting caught (1 -P), where the choices are exhaustive and where P + (1 -P) =1.…”

A Strategic Model of Magical Thinking: Axioms and Analysis

“…Also, in Roemer's (2010;2013) Kantian equilibrium each player prefers the equilibrium to any strategy profile that features identical deviations by all players. 8 Related features are found in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), who introduce rule-utilitarian players into a model of voting (see also Coate and Conlin (2004); Ali and Lin (2013)). As illustrated by their names, the modeling of both Kantian equilibrium and rule-utilitarian players are motivated by ethical concepts, in contrast to our psychological interpretation of magical thinking.…”