Why Paraconsistent Logic Can Only Tell Half the Truth

Bromand, Joachim

doi:10.1093/mind/111.444.741

Cited by 35 publications

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“…Im Falle von Fields Ansatz argumentiert Graham Priest (2005) für diese These. Im Falle von Priests Ansatz schien die entsprechende Behauptung u. a. durch Bromand (2002) erwiesen zu sein. Priest hat inzwischen versucht, diese Kritik zu entkräften (siehe Priest 2006a, Kap.…”

Section: Vgl Diesbezüglich Bromand (2009) Kap IIIunclassified

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Das Nichtbegriffliche in der Logik

Bromand¹

2010

Was Sich Nicht Sagen Lässt

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Section: Vgl Diesbezüglich Bromand (2009) Kap IIIunclassified

“…Nun kann ausgehend von diesem Satz mit Hilfe von A + der Satz 1 = 0 hergeleitet werden: (*) h L p 1=0 (Bromand 2002). Dieses Ergebnis ist für LP fatal.…”

Section: Vgl Diesbezüglich Bromand (2009) Kap IIIunclassified

Das Nichtbegriffliche in der Logik

Bromand¹

2010

Was Sich Nicht Sagen Lässt

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“…What is going on here is that when we utter a wf, we utter it relative to a particular interpretation: we mean something-some particular thing-by the wf we utter. 3 The particular interpretation that is relevant in a given case is often called the intended interpretation. This name is misleading however, and I prefer to follow Islam [9] and call it the correct interpretation.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…However this interpretation is not the correct one: when you said 'Helen Clark is tall', you did not mean that Don Brash is a female. The correct interpretation of your utterance 3 It is possible to make the right sounds (or shapes) without actually uttering wfs. Arguably there is a stage when they are learning language at which children do this.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In particular, consider the treatment of the Liar paradox which says that the Liar is both true and not true-just as the Liar reasoning shows [17]. Bromand [3] has recently argued convincingly that this account of the Liar faces a strengthened Liar paradox. If so, then for reasons similar to those discussed above, the dialetheist solution is either incomplete, or implicitly rejects Semantic Regularity (or resorts to hand-waving to deny that it does either of these).…”

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Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox

Smith

2006

Monist

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There are two main tasks in which writers on the Liar paradox might see themselves as engaged. The first task is saying what is going on in a natural language such as English when we say things such as 'This sentence is not true'. The second task is constructing consistent formal systems which have as much expressive power as possible, or which can express certain notions in which the author is particularly interested. Many authors attempt both tasks at once: they present a consistent formal system, and argue that it provides a model of natural languages such as English.My task here is the first one. I do present a consistent formal system and claim that it provides a perfect model of natural languages such as English, but this system involves no surprises. It is none other than the standard framework of classical logic and model theory. The real weight of the argument lies in the claim that the classical framework-without alteration or addition-contains the resources to model what happens when we say in English 'This sentence is not true'.Apart from the fact that it is one hundred percent classical, the solution to the Liar to be presented here has two other notable features. First, it does not generate a strengthened Liar paradox or revenge problem. Second, the entrenched belief which the solution asks us to relinquish-and of course it must ask us to give up some such belief, for the Liar would not be a paradox if it could be solved without giving up anything-(a) is a belief whose proper home is philosophy of language, not logic; (b) is a quite general belief about the operation of language, rather than a particular belief about a certain class of words-in particular it is not a belief specifically about 'is true'; and (c) is also the key to a host of other deep philosophical problems such as Quine's problem of the indeterminacy of meaning, Kripkenstein's sceptical puzzle, Putnam's paradox, the problem of empty names, and a recalcitrant problem about the semantics of vague language-the problem of false precision. § 2. the classical framework. I have said that my solution stays entirely within the bounds of classical logic and model theory. To begin, I

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Necessary Truths are Just True: A Reply to Rossberg

Hughes

2014

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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One longstanding problem for glut theorists (also known as dialetheists) is the problem of 'just true.' On Beall's conservative version of glut theory advanced in Spandrels of Truth (2009), he addresses the problem in two steps. The first is a rejection of the problem: he claims that the only general notion of 'just true' is just truth itself. On that view, the alleged problem of 'just true' is reduced to the problem of truth itself, which (according to glut theorists) has a solution-glut theory. The second step is to acknowledge that there is a notion of 'just true' which is more limited but nonetheless meets all reasonable criteria demanded by those who advance the longstanding just-true objection. Marcus Rossberg (Thought 2013) disagrees. According to Rossberg, a just-true operator ought to iterate and be non-arbitrary in ways that Beall's proposed just-true operator is not. My aim in this paper is to construct a new conditional in terms of which a new just-true operator may be defined, a necessity operator, and to show that it meets all of the target desiderata of the debate. I then use that new operator to address the arbitrariness worries raised by Rossberg.

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Why Paraconsistent Logic Can Only Tell Half the Truth

Cited by 35 publications

References 1 publication

Das Nichtbegriffliche in der Logik

Das Nichtbegriffliche in der Logik

Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox

Necessary Truths are Just True: A Reply to Rossberg

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