Why Moral Reasoning Is Insufficient for Moral Progress

Tam, A.

doi:10.1111/jopp.12187

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Rationalisations against veganism readily occur when the issue is not thought through. Indeed, we are prone to motivated ignorance (Tam 2019 , p. 6). The objection that animals only exist to be eaten and various other defensive tactics, exhibit apathy in the face of superior evidence to the contrary.…”

Section: Two Rationalisationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moody-Adams ( 2017 , p. 155–6) discusses the motivating power of hope, specifically how those social movements which deepened our understanding of justice and compassion were driven by those who were confident in acting on their moral convictions and hopeful of moral change. Similarly, Agnes Tam emphasises the power of “We-reasoning” as a distinctive form of communitarian rationality (Tam 2019 , p. 3). Naturally, this does not mean that one abandons self-critical thinking, but it is a potential pitfall of identity groups (Fukuyama 2018 , p. 115).…”

Section: Two Rationalisationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Veganism, Moral Motivation and False Consciousness

Pickett

2021

J Agric Environ Ethics

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Despite the strength of arguments for veganism in the animal rights literature, alongside environmental and other anthropocentric concerns posed by industrialised animal agriculture, veganism remains only a minority standpoint. In this paper, I explore the moral motivational problem of veganism from the perspectives of moral psychology and political false consciousness. I argue that a novel interpretation of the post-Marxist notion of political false consciousness may help to make sense of the widespread refusal to shift towards veganism. Specifically, the notion of false consciousness fills some explanatory gaps left by the moral psychological notion of akrasia, often understood to refer to a weakness of will. Central to my approach is the idea that animal exploitation is largely systemic and the assumption that moral motivation is inseparable from moral thinking. In this light, the primary obstacle to the adoption of veganism arises not so much from a failure to put genuine beliefs into action, but rather in a shared, distorted way of thinking about animals. Thus, common unreflective objections to veganism may be said to be manifestations of false consciousness.

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Section: Two Rationalisationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Two Rationalisationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Veganism, Moral Motivation and False Consciousness

Pickett

2021

J Agric Environ Ethics

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“…That is, though correct moral judgments alone may be insufficient for full moral progress (cf. Tam, 2019 ), our argument merely requires that correct moral judgments are of some importance for full moral progress. By “full moral progress”, we do not mean progress where a final state of moral perfection is reached such that no further moral improvements are possible.…”

Section: Moral Progress Requires Cognitive Controlmentioning

confidence: 97%

Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control

Klenk

Sauer

2021

Philosophical Psychology

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We propose a fundamental challenge to the feasibility of moral progress: most extant theories of progress, we will argue, assume an unrealistic level of cognitive control people must have over their moral judgments for moral progress to occur. Moral progress depends at least in part on the possibility of individual people improving their moral cognition to eliminate the pernicious influence of various epistemically defective biases and other distorting factors. Since the degree of control people can exert over their moral cognition tends to be significantly overestimated, the prospects of moral progress face a formidable problem, the force of which has thus far been underappreciated. In the paper, we will provide both conceptual and empirical arguments for this thesis, and explain its most important implications.

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“…Moody‐Adams (1999) and Anderson (2014) argue that philosophy rarely produces by itself the “engaged moral inquirers,” “moral gadflies,” artists, and social movements whose contentious politics confront the powerful with a practical (and not merely speculative) moral problem that reveals their moral error. Buchanan and Powell (2018), Appiah (2011), and others downplay the causal role of moral agency as less decisive than surrounding socioeconomic conditions and wider group dynamics, for example, by arguing that moral revolutions are driven more by parochial codes of honor than advances in moral reasoning (Hermann, 2019; Pleasants, 2011; Tam, 2019). Others argue that social change is best achieved by designing social institutions that seek to alter social norms rather than improving moral reasoning: through adjustments in expectations, incentives, and sanctions (Bicchieri, 2016; Mackie, 1996; Sankaran, 2019).…”

Section: Liberal Reformmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theorizing social change

Zheng

2022

Philosophy Compass

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In this article I argue that social change deserves to be recognized as an area of philosophical study in its own right. I provide a non-exhaustive overview of existing philosophical work that addresses the problem of social change, alongside a preliminary framework elucidating some key concepts and distinctions for conceptualizing transformative social change. More specifically, I sketch out two broadly opposed approaches to social change -"liberal" versus radical -in order to excavate some assumptions underlying extant philosophical literatures (and popular thinking) about change. I then briefly outline some other fundamental problems common to all processes of social change.

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Why Moral Reasoning Is Insufficient for Moral Progress

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Veganism, Moral Motivation and False Consciousness

Veganism, Moral Motivation and False Consciousness

Moral Judgement and Moral Progress: The Problem of Cognitive Control

Theorizing social change

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