Abstract:This paper explores the factors that affect Taiwanese citizens’ resistance to closer relations with China. Elements in Taiwanese society have recently exhibited a strong sense of anxiety in the face of a rising China. Distinct from the past military confrontation between China and Taiwan, more recently, Taiwanese citizens have been subject to a strengthening of cross-Strait relations and interactions, which makes their rising resistance to China puzzling. To empirically and theoretically explain why Taiwanese … Show more
“…Taiwan’s resistance to China—and the latter’s persistent efforts to shape the hearts and minds of its residents—is reflected in previous studies that asked the Taiwanese public direct questions concerning their perceptions of China, the leadership in Beijing, and the Chinese people. While there were indeed periods of relative calm, a large proportion of Taiwanese continue to hold unfriendly or mixed feelings toward China and on most cross-Strait issues (Gries and Su, 2013; Tzeng et al, 2017; Wang and Cheng, 2017). These unfavorable views stem to a large extent from the negative impressions created by China’s incessant saber-rattling and verbal threats against Taiwan and the authoritarian government in Beijing, and in part from public worries about China’s harmful influence on Taiwan’s full-fledged democracy given its enormous economic and military might (Lee et al, 2018).…”
Do citizens reveal their valid preferences when asked about a potential foreign threat? This study presents the results of two list experiments implemented in Taiwan, a democratic and independently ruled island that leaders in China have long vowed to reunify with the mainland. Our two experiments—conducted in March 2019 and September 2021—focus on the percentage of Taiwanese who perceive China as a “friend” and those who regard China as an “enemy.” The findings reveal that, first, the proportion of Taiwanese citizens who harbored hostile feelings toward China grew by 30% points between the two dates. In comparison, those with a more friendly perception of China declined by 18% points. Second, we detected significant misreporting or preference falsification when comparing the list experiment estimates with answers to a direct question. Third, we found evidence that the hypothesized China-ambivalent respondents are most likely to have switched their perceptions of China.
“…Taiwan’s resistance to China—and the latter’s persistent efforts to shape the hearts and minds of its residents—is reflected in previous studies that asked the Taiwanese public direct questions concerning their perceptions of China, the leadership in Beijing, and the Chinese people. While there were indeed periods of relative calm, a large proportion of Taiwanese continue to hold unfriendly or mixed feelings toward China and on most cross-Strait issues (Gries and Su, 2013; Tzeng et al, 2017; Wang and Cheng, 2017). These unfavorable views stem to a large extent from the negative impressions created by China’s incessant saber-rattling and verbal threats against Taiwan and the authoritarian government in Beijing, and in part from public worries about China’s harmful influence on Taiwan’s full-fledged democracy given its enormous economic and military might (Lee et al, 2018).…”
Do citizens reveal their valid preferences when asked about a potential foreign threat? This study presents the results of two list experiments implemented in Taiwan, a democratic and independently ruled island that leaders in China have long vowed to reunify with the mainland. Our two experiments—conducted in March 2019 and September 2021—focus on the percentage of Taiwanese who perceive China as a “friend” and those who regard China as an “enemy.” The findings reveal that, first, the proportion of Taiwanese citizens who harbored hostile feelings toward China grew by 30% points between the two dates. In comparison, those with a more friendly perception of China declined by 18% points. Second, we detected significant misreporting or preference falsification when comparing the list experiment estimates with answers to a direct question. Third, we found evidence that the hypothesized China-ambivalent respondents are most likely to have switched their perceptions of China.
This study utilized the newly-designed Bayesian equal part regression (BEPR) model to analyze the Taiwan National Security surveyed data from 2015 in order to construct a model of Taiwanese people’s regime acceptance of Mainland China and U.S governments. The study also used the Bayesian Regression model to make a comparison with the BEPR model results and attempted to explore the fluctuations of post mean and post probability of non-zero coefficients for each independent variable in the BEPR model. The major findings are as follows: First, the first equal part of respondents who believe that China would coerce Taiwan to make concessions have the lesser negative level of the regime acceptance of Mainland China, while the second equal part of the respondents who have the same attitude have the higher negative regime acceptance level. The second equal part of respondents who deem the higher possibility of unification have the lesser positive view on the regime acceptance level. Additionally, the first equal part of respondents who have higher evaluation of cross-strait relations have lesser positive impact on the regime acceptance of Mainland China. Second, we obtain the results that the second-third of Taiwanese respondents who have the optimistic household economic outlook or agree to reduce the purchase of U.S. military weapons if Mainland China withdraws its missiles have a higher negative impact on the regime acceptance of the U.S. However, the third equal part of Taiwanese respondents who agree with the current “R.O.C.” country name have a higher negative regime acceptance level of the U.S.
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