This article considers the Westphalian model and its supposed origins in nineteenth-and early twentieth-century positivist thought. It shows how three German theorists, Georg Jellinek, Heinrich Triepel and Max Huber, subscribed to a weak version of the Westphalian model that allows for a multilateral international community based on law but not the strong version associated with absolute sovereignty and the exclusion of international community. It further shows how their ideas, especially their rejection of private property and contract law analogies, and their treatment of sovereignty, are of continuing relevance. It also serves as a correction to the all too frequent portrayal of German thought at this time in terms of hyper-nationalism and proto-Darwinian approaches to the international order. The Westphalian state system has long been a central model in international relations. 1 Indeed Barry Buzan and Richard Little have argued that 'the Westphalian straitjacket' restricts our ability to grasp the diversity and dynamics of the international system. 2 Similarly, Darrel E. Paul has referred to the 'Westphalian blind alley' that can accommodate only the 'real-state: hierarchical, coercive and sovereign' but not federal or decentralised states. 3 Yet much depends on exactly what is understood by the Westphalian model. According to one set of interpretations the Westphalian model had little to do with the Peace of Westphalia. It was, rather, a product of nineteenth-and early twentieth-century realpolitik and nationalism. In this version of the Westphalian model, which will be referred to below as the strong model, the actors in international relations are states claiming absolute sovereignty, a congruence between state and society exists, states are centralised and lack 'internal political differentiation', international community is largely excluded and relations between states, including international law, are modelled on the analogy of private contract and property law, insofar as international law is said to exist at all. 4 Against this 'strong' model I set a 'weak' model. 5 According to this model, states are the prime actors in international relations, but not necessarily the only ones. Congruence between state and society does not exist. International community, constituted by common interests and mutual recognition expressed in law, is prominent and, crucially, the analogy of private contract law is rejected. States r i at UNIV OF NORTH DAKOTA on June 4, 2015 ire.sagepub.com Downloaded from