2013
DOI: 10.1108/ijrdm-05-2013-0097
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Why include royalties in distribution contracts? Evidence from France

Abstract: PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to understand the presence of royalties in a number of retail contracts, recognising that some distribution networks do not use this monetary provision.Design/methodology/approachThe paper is based on the theory of contracts. It provides an econometric analysis of recent French data using the main theoretical explanation concerning the presence of royalties in distribution contractual relationships.FindingsThe evidence suggests that the presence of royalties in distribution … Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Third, our paper draws on the literature examining the status and the autonomy of franchisees Dant and Gundlach, 1999;Pizanti and Lerner, 2003;Yongsun and Choi, 2007) by highlighting that, under certain conditions, the borders between franchisees and employees are sometimes fuzzy. Fourth, we extend the research on franchise contracts (Buchan, 2013;Fadairo, 2013;Cochet and Garg, 2008;Lapiedra et al, 2012;Solis-Rodriguez and Gonzalez-Diaz, 2012) by focusing on their potential reclassification as branch manager contracts or as employment contracts. Fifth, our approach is based on a double perspective stemming from business and law disciplines, thus extending recentre search which mixes both approaches (Barasnevicius Quagliato, 2008;Perrigot et al, 2013a, b;Williamson and Kleiner, 2003).…”
Section: Contributions To Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Third, our paper draws on the literature examining the status and the autonomy of franchisees Dant and Gundlach, 1999;Pizanti and Lerner, 2003;Yongsun and Choi, 2007) by highlighting that, under certain conditions, the borders between franchisees and employees are sometimes fuzzy. Fourth, we extend the research on franchise contracts (Buchan, 2013;Fadairo, 2013;Cochet and Garg, 2008;Lapiedra et al, 2012;Solis-Rodriguez and Gonzalez-Diaz, 2012) by focusing on their potential reclassification as branch manager contracts or as employment contracts. Fifth, our approach is based on a double perspective stemming from business and law disciplines, thus extending recentre search which mixes both approaches (Barasnevicius Quagliato, 2008;Perrigot et al, 2013a, b;Williamson and Kleiner, 2003).…”
Section: Contributions To Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Franchisors justify charging royalties to franchisees on the basis of their commitment to transferring concepts and know-how and to promoting the franchise network (Fadairo, 2013). As stated by signaling theory, potential franchisees are more disposed to open an outlet with a franchise that demands higher royalties.…”
Section: Franchise Royaltiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Empirical evidence in marketing literature also suggests that fairness in exchange relationships with channel partners plays a significant role in relationship development and maintenance (Kumar et al , 1995; Lund et al , 2013; Samaha et al , 2011). Thus, there is a need to explore issues of fairness in managing and developing relationship with franchisees (Fadairo, 2013; Perrigot et al , 2015). There is also a need to explore fairness and its impact on relational outcomes in a franchise relationship (Altinay et al , 2014; Croonen, 2010; Grace et al , 2013; Weaven et al , 2014).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%