Why implicit attitudes are (probably) not beliefs

Abstract

Should we understand implicit attitudes on the model of belief? I argue that implicit attitudes are (probably) members of a different psychological kind altogether, because they seem to be insensitive to the logical form of an agent's thoughts and perceptions. A state is sensitive to logical form only if it is sensitive to the logical constituents of the content of other states (e.g., operators like negation and conditional). I explain sensitivity to logical form and argue that it is a necessary condition for belief. I appeal to two areas of research that seem to show that implicit attitudes fail spectacularly to satisfy this condition-although persistent gaps in the empirical literature leave matters inconclusive. I sketch an alternative account, according to which implicit attitudes are sensitive merely to spatiotemporal relations in thought and perception, i.e., the spatial and temporal orders in which people think, see, or hear things.

Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias

“…It might be objected that sometimes it is not possible to get a proper understanding of the situation of an individual or set of individuals without awareness of certain facts about the social realities that they have encountered in their everyday lives (Madva 2016a). To properly understand the difficulties faced by women in science, such as the lack of mentoring opportunities, it is necessary to comprehend the social reality of female underrepresentation in the sciences.…”

“…3. There is some debate about whether implicit biases are beliefs (Mandelbaum 2015), belief-like states (Schwitzgebel 2010;Levy 2015) or belong in a distinct psychological category from beliefs (Gendler 2008a(Gendler , 2008b(Gendler , 2011Madva 2016a). There is also debate over whether they are propositional (Mandelbaum 2015) or merely associative (Gendler 2008a(Gendler , 2008b.…”

“…In another example, the use of implementation intentions or "if-then" plans has been encouraged (e.g. Stewart and Payne 2008;Saul 2013;Madva 2016a). When someone forms an implementation intention they form a specific action plan such as if I meet a woman in science, I will think scientific expert.…”

A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads Social Policy

“…Writers like Banks, Ford, and Haslanger are responding in particular to the upsurge of interest in implicit (unreported) rather than explicit (self-reported) prejudice, while Dixon et al (2012) primarily discuss explicit prejudice. I will not weigh in here on the various controversies about the best ways to measure, conceptualize, and predict prejudice and discrimination (but see, e.g., Madva 2016a;2016b;Brownstein & Madva 2012;Madva & Brownstein 2017). In what follows, I appeal to research on both implicit and explicit prejudice, and I believe we should draw the same general lessons for addressing both types of problematic attitude.…”

Biased by our imaginings

“…Though as Madva notes, Gawronski and colleagues did not test the effects of affirming stereotypes or negating counterstereotypes, a comparison of these is needed for a direct test of biases interacting with the same logical form in different ways (Madva, , p. 2669).…”