Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?

Pautz, Adam

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195386196.003.0010

Cited by 132 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 47 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Now, if numerically different objects o i and o j figure as arguments of the relational function, there is a sense in which the experience represents an impossible content: the dots are represented as two in the argument of the function and as one in the value of the function. The trouble here is that IOMs do not seem to present an impossible state of affairs, contrary to what occurs in other well‐known cases like the waterfall illusion, in which a stationary object seems to move and stand still at the same time (Pautz, , p. 274).…”

Section: Object‐directed Experiences and Perceptual Contentmentioning

confidence: 65%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content

Echeverri

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Austere relationism rejects the orthodox analysis of hallucinations and illusions as incorrect perceptual representations. In this article, I argue that illusions of optimal motion (IOMs) present a serious challenge for this view. First, I submit that austere‐relationist accounts of misleading experiences cannot be adapted to account for IOMs. Second, I show that any attempt at elucidating IOMs within an austere‐relationist framework undermines the claim that perceptual experiences fundamentally involve relations to mind‐independent objects. Third, I develop a representationalist model of IOMs. The proposed analysis combines two ideas: Evans' dynamic modes of presentation and Fine's relational semantics for identity.

show abstract

Section: Object‐directed Experiences and Perceptual Contentmentioning

confidence: 65%

“…Pautz (, p. 284) has argued that a common‐factor analysis of phenomenology does not entail a common factor analysis of perceptual reference (see also Kennedy, ). The previous considerations suggest that phenomenology is not orthogonal to perceptual reference.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content

Echeverri

2016

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Now, Adam Pautz suggests one possible anti‐qualia response: we could understand the phrase “there is blur everywhere” non‐predicationally, like when we say “it is raining” (Pautz, , p. 304). This allows the blur to seem to be externally located even though we do not attribute blurriness to the objects around us.…”

Section: The (Alleged) Counter‐examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent

Gow

2019

European J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience is internally constituted. However, my concern in this paper is not with the metaphysical debate but with transparency as a phenomenological feature of perceptual experience. Qualia theorists have presented a number of examples of perceptual experiences which, they claim, do not even seem to be transparent; these experiences involve objects or properties which seem to be internally realized. I argue, contrary to the qualia theorist's claim, that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can in fact be characterized solely with reference to externally located objects and properties, and the sense in which some features of our perceptual experiences do not seem external is due to cognitive, not perceptual, phenomenology.

show abstract

“…English does not have a word to denote such a perceptual attitudinal relation. Byrne (: 437) calls the relation the ex‐ing relation; Pautz (: 54) calls it the sensorily entertaining relation; Siegel (: 22) calls it the A‐relation. While the propositional attitude thesis is a version of the content thesis, we can accept the content thesis without accepting the propositional attitude thesis.…”

Section: Perception and Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defense of Perceptual Content

Schellenberg

2017

Philosophical Perspectives

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Why Explain Visual Experience in Terms of Content?

Cited by 132 publications

References 47 publications

Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content

Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content

Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent

In Defense of Perceptual Content

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About