Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis

Moore, Michael O.; Fox, Alan

doi:10.1007/s10290-009-0035-0

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Per capita national product in these countries can range from three to five times that in China. 6 For detailed discussions of the administrative procedure that affects the determination of the normal market value and the dumping margins of Chinese exports, see Moore (2006); Moore and Fox (2006). 7 To the best of our knowledge, the Nicita and Olarrega database provides the most up-to-date trade data recorded at 3-digit ISIC levels.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

US antidumping actions against China: the impact of China's entry into the World Trade Organization

Zeng

Liang

2010

Review of International Political Economy

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

US antidumping actions against China: the impact of China's entry into the World Trade Organization

Zeng

Liang

2010

Review of International Political Economy

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“…There are many anti‐dumping controversies that have direct analogues to the CBTA debate. For example, there are contentious disagreements in WTO negotiations and disputes about how to treat foreigners if they do not cooperate with domestic investigators seeking information (Moore and Fox, 2010), how to remove anti‐dumping orders when circumstances have changed (Moore, 2002), and how to deal with new foreign firms that try to enter the domestic market and that have not been part of earlier anti‐dumping investigations. Nearly identical problems will arise with implementing firm‐specific CBTAs.…”

Section: Constraints On Carbon Border Tax Adjustment Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementing Carbon Tariffs: A Fool’s Errand?

Moore

2011

World Economy

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The absence of a global treaty on climate change abatement raises the chances that jurisdictions across the world will adopt substantially different approaches to greenhouse gas emissions. This further increases the possibility that some governments might consider taxes on imports based on carbon content from countries that have not introduced similarly restrictive climate change policies. Such border taxes certainly appeal to domestic industries facing higher charges for their own carbon emissions. This research demonstrates that there are enormous practical difficulties surrounding such plans. Various policies are evaluated based on the following constraints: adherence to World Trade Organisation compliance, administrative plausibility, help in meeting environmental goals and ability to deal with domestic pressures. The steel industry is used as a case study in this analysis. All considered policies arguably fail to meet at least one of these constraints, bringing into question the plausibility that a carbon border tax can be practical policy.

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“…See Article 6.8 and Annex II ADA. 56 For a discussion about foreign firms' decision to cooperate in anti-dumping investigations seeMoore (2005) andMoore and Fox (2010).57 Public-opinion polls routinely take such considerations into account. For example, suppose a country's citizens are 50% female.…”

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confidence: 99%

US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam: A Stir-Fry of Seafood, Statistics, and Lacunae

Broude

Moore

2013

World Trade Review

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This unappealed Panel Report deals with now standard controversies involving US zeroing practices, but also involves a number of novel problems in administrative reviews of US anti-dumping orders that transcend zeroing issues. Most importantly, this dispute highlights the economic, legal, and statistical importance of sample-selection bias when calculating ‘all others’ rates for exporters that were not queried during dumping investigations. Sampling is particularly problematic in this dispute since US investigators found only zero and de minimis margins in the administrative reviews, a situation in which the relevant provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement appears to provide no guidance (an apparent ‘lacuna’). The Panel did not directly deal with the key sample-selection issues in the case, and so we provide an alternative legal and statistical analysis. These issues are likely to become more important as the practice of zeroing is phased out in the United States. Indeed, sampling may well be the new zeroing.

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Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis

Abstract: Antidumping, Facts-available, US trade policy, F10, F13, F14,

Cited by 7 publications

References 7 publications

US antidumping actions against China: the impact of China's entry into the World Trade Organization

US antidumping actions against China: the impact of China's entry into the World Trade Organization

Implementing Carbon Tariffs: A Fool’s Errand?

US – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam: A Stir-Fry of Seafood, Statistics, and Lacunae

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