Why does the perception-action functional dichotomy not match the ventral-dorsal streams anatomical segregation:

Gangopadhyay, Nivedita; Madary, Michael; Spicer, Finn; Rossetti, Yves; Ota, Hisaaki; Blangero, Annabelle; Vighetto, Alain; Pisella, Laure

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.003.0010

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…What Bartolo and colleagues discovered was that when participants were asked to fixate on the red LED, either in Fixed near or Fixed far conditions, the boundary of peripersonal space increased for IG but not HC: there was 'an overestimation of nearly 10 cm in the Fixed far condition compared to 1.8 cm in the Free gaze condition [and the reaction time] for stimuli at the boundary of reachable space was registered in the Fixed far (3313 m) and Fixed near condition (2875 ms) compared to the Free gaze condition (2756 m)' (Bartolo et al 2018, 110). This finding that IG presents difficulty with reaching movements only when fixating on a target is not new; it is widely reported that optic ataxics only present difficulty in performing reaching movements in peripheral, not central, vision (Perenin and Vighetto 1988;Rossetti et al 2010). What is new is the overestimation of the boundary of peripersonal space when IG fixates on a target.…”

Section: Optic Ataxia and Peripersonal Spacementioning

confidence: 79%

On the immediate mental antecedent of action

Omoge

2022

Philosophical Explorations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What representational state mediates between perception and action? Bence Nanay says pragmatic representations, which are outputs of perceptual systems. This commits him to the view that optic ataxics face difficulty in performing visually guided arm movements because the relevant perceptual systems output their pragmatic representations incorrectly. Here, I argue that it is not enough to say that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly; we also need to know why they are output that way. Given recent evidence that optic ataxia impairs peripersonal space representation, I argue that pragmatic representations are output incorrectly because the organizing principle of the visionfor-action system is blocked by optic ataxia. I then show how this means that this principle, not pragmatic representations, is the representational state that mediates between perception and action, i.e. the principle, not pragmatic representations, is the immediate mental antecedent of action.

show abstract

Section: Optic Ataxia and Peripersonal Spacementioning

confidence: 79%

On the immediate mental antecedent of action

Omoge

2022

Philosophical Explorations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The effects of neurological lesions of the SPL-IPS have been long described as leading to optic ataxia ( Perenin et al, 1988 ). Movements directed to peripheral visual targets are imprecise, and most often deviated toward the side of the injured hemisphere that means movements were hypometric ( Blangero et al, 2010 ; Rossetti et al, 2010 ; Rossetti et al, 2017 ; Vindras et al, 2016 ). In central vision (free-vision), few errors were observed (patient outcomes were similar to those of healthy subjects) ( Rossetti et al, 2010 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Movements directed to peripheral visual targets are imprecise, and most often deviated toward the side of the injured hemisphere that means movements were hypometric (Blangero et al, 2010;Rossetti et al, 2010;Rossetti et al, 2017;Vindras et al, 2016). In central vision (free-vision), few errors were observed (patient outcomes were similar to those of healthy subjects) (Rossetti et al, 2010). One interpretation is that patients with optic ataxia largely underestimate the distance of objects in the visual field contralateral to the lesion (the ataxic field), which results in pathological hypometry of pointing movements.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Role of the Dorsal Posterior Parietal Cortex in the Accurate Perception of Object Magnitude in Peripheral Vision

et al. 2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Following superior parietal lobule and intraparietal sulcus (SPL-IPS) damage, optic ataxia patients underestimate the distance of objects in the ataxic visual field such that they produce hypometric pointing errors. The metrics of these pointing errors relative to visual target eccentricity fit the cortical magnification of central vision. The SPL-IPS would therefore implement an active “peripheral magnification” to match the real metrics of the environment for accurate action. We further hypothesized that this active compensation of the central magnification by the SPL-IPS contributes to actual object’ size perception in peripheral vision. Three optic ataxia patients and 10 age-matched controls were assessed in comparing the thickness of two rectangles flashed simultaneously, one in central and another in peripheral vision. The bilateral optic ataxia patient exhibited exaggerated underestimation bias and uncertainty compared to the control group in both visual fields. The two unilateral optic ataxia patients exhibited a pathological asymmetry between visual fields: size perception performance was affected in their contralesional peripheral visual field compared to their healthy side. These results demonstrate that the SPL-IPS contributes to accurate size perception in peripheral vision.

show abstract

“…For instance, Milner and Goodale are at odds with Yves Rossetti, Laure Pisella, and their colleagues over the way to describe the role of the dorsal stream (Pisella et al 2006;Rossetti et al 2010;Milner and Goodale 2010 Crick and Koch (1998: 98) and Chalmers (2000: 21). Also note that some of Andy Clark's work on this topic supposes that Milner and Goodale are correct in emphasizing the dichotomy between conscious vision for perception versus unconscious vision for action.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dorsal stream and the visual horizon

Madary

2011

Phenom Cogn Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Today many philosophers of mind accept that the two cortical streams of visual processing in humans can be distinguished in terms of conscious experience. The ventral stream is thought to produce representations that may become conscious, and the dorsal stream is thought to handle unconscious vision for action. Despite a vast literature on the topic of the two streams, there is currently no account of the way in which the relevant empirical evidence could fit with basic Husserlian phenomenology of vision. Here I offer such an account. In this article, I show how the empirical evidence ought to be understood in a way that is informed by phenomenology. The differences in the two streams are better described as differences in spatial and temporal processing. Rather than simply "unconscious," the dorsal stream can be better described as making a special contribution to what Husserl identified as the visual horizon.

show abstract

Why does the perception-action functional dichotomy not match the ventral-dorsal streams anatomical segregation:

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

On the immediate mental antecedent of action

On the immediate mental antecedent of action

Role of the Dorsal Posterior Parietal Cortex in the Accurate Perception of Object Magnitude in Peripheral Vision

The dorsal stream and the visual horizon

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About