Why Do Soldiers Give Up? A Self-Preservation Theory of Surrender

Grauer, Ryan

doi:10.1080/09636412.2014.935238

Cited by 6 publications

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“…Costa and Kahn (2003) find that age, ideology, marital status, and occupation are also important predictors of whether individuals desert their units. Expectations of favorable treatment and short captivity also make soldiers more likely to surrender (Grauer 2014) In line with the literature on “greed” in civil war, a further factor to consider is economic and professional self-interest. In an important study, La Parra-Perez (2020) does examine the decisions to take sides of individual officers at the outset of the Spanish Civil War (1936–9).…”

Section: The Motivations Of Military Officersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War

White

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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A critical element in civil wars is military fragmentation. Yet, we have a limited understanding of why military elites fight in civil wars and on what side. In this article I develop a theory of the economic and professional motivations of military elites. I test this theory using the case of West Point graduates in the American Civil War. I argue that in addition to home state, economic and professional interests were a major influence on West Pointers. Graduates with connections to Southern cash crops were less likely to fight for the Union and more likely to fight for the Confederacy. Higher ranking graduates were more likely to fight for both sides, as they were better positioned to compete for promotion. I test this argument using a new dataset of more than 1000 West Point graduates’ wartime allegiances and antebellum careers and find strong evidence in support of my expectations.

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Section: The Motivations Of Military Officersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War

White

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Hence, this article develops a followers' commitment problem: the inability to credibly commit to good treatment if an adversary's follower defects or surrenders can lengthen a civil conflict. Moreover, going beyond past work showing the importance of credible promises of good treatment for inducing defection and surrender, 21 it shows that one party to a conflict can lack credibility not because of its own characteristics or actions, but in fact because of its adversary's. Specifically, by pursuing ethnic exclusion, a regime can make rebels less trustworthy.…”

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confidence: 93%

The Loyalty Trap: Regime Ethnic Exclusion, Commitment Problems, and Civil War Duration in Syria and Beyond

McLauchlin

2017

Security Studies

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This article examines the impact of the ethnic exclusiveness of regimes on commitment problems and hence on civil conflict duration. It argues that members of privileged in-groups in highly exclusive regimes can be trapped into compliance with the regime. Ethnic exclusion helps to construct privileged-group members as regime loyalists. They therefore fear rebel reprisals even if they surrender or defect, and hence persist in fighting. The article finds in particular that privileged-group members mistrust even rebels who mobilize on a non-ethnic agenda. Severe ethnic exclusion induces members of privileged groups to regard rebel reassurances, including non-ethnic aims, as suspect. Exclusion therefore induces privileged-group cohesion, an effect more resistant to rebel reassurances than previously recognized. A case study of the Syrian civil war shows this dynamic at a micro level, and a cross-national statistical analysis gives partial evidence that it lengthens civil conflicts on a large scale. This article examines whether, and how, ethnic politics makes civil conflicts long and intractable. 1 It studies the impact of regime ethnic 2 exclusiveness on credible commitments and hence on civil war duration. It argues that ethnic exclusion by the regime undermines the trust in rebel reassurances that members of privileged groups might have. Ethnic exclusion puts privileged groups in a loyalty trap: while some privileged-group members enjoy greater access to

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Confronting Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness

Reiter¹

The Sword's Other Edge

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Why Do Soldiers Give Up? A Self-Preservation Theory of Surrender

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War

Rebel, Remain, or Resign? Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War

The Loyalty Trap: Regime Ethnic Exclusion, Commitment Problems, and Civil War Duration in Syria and Beyond

Confronting Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness

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