Why do sanctions need time to work? Adjustment, learning and anticipation

Bergeijk, Peter A.G. van; Marrewijk, Charles van

doi:10.1016/0264-9993(94)00003-n

Cited by 28 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Rather than analyzing Section 301 disputes as singular events, this analysis disaggregates each dispute into discrete time periods so that the processes by which the disputants arrived at their decisions can be studied. This approach is consistent with the perspective that states' decisions are based upon incomplete information and uncertainty about the future (Bergeijk & Marrewijk, ). In any given year, both the sender and target states must make a calculated choice based upon the costs and benefits of continuing the dispute or acquiescing.…”

Section: Empirical Analysissupporting

confidence: 76%

“…Time potentially played a major role in both affecting disputants' resolve and in providing information about the extent of each party's commitment to win the dispute in question. One reason why Section 301 proceedings often took time to work is that their targets may have needed “some time to arrive at ‘better’ (more realistic) estimates of the probability that” U.S. policy makers would hold out if they refused to capitulate (Van Bergeijk & Marrewijk, , 85). Thus, a target's perception of the United States' resolve played a crucial role in its decision to acquiesce or not.…”

Section: Preventive Vs Promotive Objectives In Section 301 Disputesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve

Berejikian¹,

Early

2013

Political Psychology

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This article draws upon recent findings from the field of neuroscience to explore how loss aversion affects foreign policy resolve. We theorize that U.S. policy makers are more resolute in pursuing preventive policies that seek to avoid losses than they are in pursuing promotive policies that seek to acquire new gains. To test our theory, we conduct the first large‐n analysis of foreign policy hypotheses derived from the neuroscience of loss aversion using data from 100 cases of U.S.‐initiated Section 301 trade disputes. The results provide strong support for the loss‐aversion‐based theory, revealing that American policy makers are willing to fight harder and hold out longer in trade disputes with preventive objectives than they are in cases with promotive ones. Our study demonstrates that hypotheses derived from neuroscientific findings can be tested using large‐n techniques in study of foreign policy, revealing a new avenue of inquiry within the field.

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Section: Empirical Analysissupporting

confidence: 76%

Section: Preventive Vs Promotive Objectives In Section 301 Disputesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve

Berejikian¹,

Early

2013

Political Psychology

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“…2 The mirror image of this empirical regularity, namely the longevity of sanction episodes, has drawn the attention of many authors. Patterns of success, failure, duration and termination of long-lived sanctions have been related to the target's and sender's institutional characteristics and the changes therein (Bolks andSoyawel, 2000, McGillivray andStam, 2005), commitment strategies (Dorussen and Mo 2001) and Bayesian learning (van Bergeijk and van Marrewijk 1995). Note: Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding Source: Calculations based on Hufbauer et al (2008) Our paper is a natural component to this literature as we offer an explanation of why success predominantly occurs in the early phase of a sanction episode.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Early Phase Success and Long Run Failure of Economic Sanctions: With an Application to Iran

Dizaji

Bergeijk²

2012

SSRN Journal

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We develop a model of the dynamics of economic sanctions in conjunction with the response of the sanction target. We apply this model to the case of the EU and US boycott of Iranian oil. Our VAR model finds significant impacts of sanctions both on key economic variables and on the political system. These effects, however, are limited in time and occur in the first two to four years of the sanction episode only because adjustment of economic structures mitigates the economic and political impact of the sanctions.

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“…Further research by Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Grossman and Helpman (1990), and others on the contribution of trade to economic growth indicates that factor productivity and product innovation depend on product diversity and market size. 6 (The prediction of additional losses is slightly at odds with the view of van Bergeijk and van Marrewijk, 1995, and others that the initial damage from sanctions should decrease (albeit not completely) over time. Their work notes that more than the gains from trade are at stake: countries that are dependent on trade (and do not anticipate sanctions) can initially be worse off than if they had not traded at all.…”

Section: B Additional Losses Over Timementioning

confidence: 79%

Costs of Economic Sanctions to the Sender

Farmer

2000

World Economy

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Why do sanctions need time to work? Adjustment, learning and anticipation

Cited by 28 publications

References 18 publications

Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve

Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve

Early Phase Success and Long Run Failure of Economic Sanctions: With an Application to Iran

Costs of Economic Sanctions to the Sender

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