Why do presidents fail? Political leadership and the Argentine crisis (1999–2001)

Llanos, Mariana; Margheritis, Ana

doi:10.1007/bf02686304

Cited by 20 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In sum, the Alianza worked very well when both political parties were in the opposition and united by their hostility toward the PJ government of President Menem. When however this UCR-FREPASO Alianza became responsible for actually governing (through its control of the presidency and of the Chamber), it showed itself to not be up to the task (Llanos and Margheritis 2006). While the UCR remained united (albeit increasingly grudgingly so in 2001), less than a third of FREPASO deputies maintained ideal points close to the UCR median.…”

Section: Ucr Frepasomentioning

confidence: 99%

Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress, 1989-2007: Understanding Inter-Party Dynamics through Roll Call Vote Analysis

Jones

Hwang

Micozzi

2009

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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Section: Ucr Frepasomentioning

confidence: 99%

Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress, 1989-2007: Understanding Inter-Party Dynamics through Roll Call Vote Analysis

Jones

Hwang

Micozzi

2009

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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“…The 2001-2002 crisis revealed a political, economic and social scenario in which cooperative practices among political actors had for long been discouraged, leading to a decision-making paralysis and, ultimately, to a crisis of governance (Llanos and Margheritis, 2006). The undermined credibility of Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and Partido Justicialista (PJ), the two largest political parties in the country, in parallel to the deep social disappointment with the government of President Fernando De la Rúa (1999Rúa ( -2001 led to the empowerment of provincial governments.…”

Section: Effects Of the New Discursive Configuration On Existing Powe...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Transnational circuits of policy knowledge and discursive migration. The formation and transformation of planning policies in Argentina

Rolo

Duineveld

Assche

2022

Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space

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We analyse the migration of academic and policy discourses that contributed to (de)legitimise the formation of planning policies in Argentina since the 1950s. We focus on the communicative/collaborative rationality discourses emanating from Anglo-American academic circles that played a role in the revival of the Argentine planning system between 2004 and 2015. We adopt an evolutionary approach to policy travel and policy learning, deploying the concepts of discursive migration and discursive configuration to better understand how ideas, people and goods/resources reinvent themselves when transnationally circulating policy knowledge takes root locally. The migration process in Argentina led to the reinforcement of prevalent coordination mechanisms, redirecting concerns and conflicts into governance structures already existing, involving players already present and forms of expertise already dominant. The migrating collaborative discourse (self) transformed in relation to the receiving governance environment, becoming an effective compliance-gaining technique, while national actors found ways to engage and discipline provinces they depended on more than before.

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“…Limited partisan support in the legislature may result from features of the party system, such as high fragmentation (Alvarez and Marsteintredet 2010; Kim and Bahry 2008) or from the breakdown of government coalitions (Mejía Acosta and Polga‐Hecimovich 2011). It may also reflect deficits in presidential leadership (Llanos and Margheritis 2006; Pérez Liñán 2007).…”

Section: Oversight and Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oversight or Representation? Public Opinion and Impeachment Resolutions in Argentina and Brazil

Llanos

Pérez‐Liñán

2020

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Why do legislators introduce impeachment resolutions against the president, even though most of these resolutions never succeed? We explore two possible answers to this puzzle, which are linked to the legislative functions of oversight and representation. First, legislators initiate impeachment procedures to expose (real or alleged) presidential misdeeds, an action that may weaken the president’s approval rates, even if an impeachment process remains unlikely. Second, legislators introduce impeachment resolutions to express their constituents’ outrage in the context of corruption scandals or poor economic performance—that is, in response to an exogenous decline in presidential approval. To test these hypotheses, we analyze 274 impeachment resolutions introduced against the presidents of Argentina and Brazil since the transition to democracy. We estimate models predicting presidential approval and impeachment resolutions using time‐series and simultaneous equations estimators. Our results strongly support the representation hypothesis.

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Why do presidents fail? Political leadership and the Argentine crisis (1999–2001)

Cited by 20 publications

References 16 publications

Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress, 1989-2007: Understanding Inter-Party Dynamics through Roll Call Vote Analysis

Government and Opposition in the Argentine Congress, 1989-2007: Understanding Inter-Party Dynamics through Roll Call Vote Analysis

Transnational circuits of policy knowledge and discursive migration. The formation and transformation of planning policies in Argentina

Oversight or Representation? Public Opinion and Impeachment Resolutions in Argentina and Brazil

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