Why Do Leaders Build Walls? Domestic Politics, Leader Survival, and The Fortification of Borders

Abstract

States around the world are fortifying their international borders at unprecedented rates. While only seven states had fortified their borders with walls or fences as of the end of World War Two, this number has now grown to more than 75. Why do states build walls on their international borders? While states may build walls to ameliorate the consequences of cross-border economic inequalities and to defend against transnational security threats, we suggest that another compelling logic stems from domestic politics and leaders’ desire to remain in office. Building on assumptions furnished by diversionary theory, we argue that national political leaders at risk of losing office are incentivized to implement popular policies, such as border wall construction, hoping that doing so will prompt a domestic rally effect. To test this argument, we assemble a global dataset of leader-years and find that politically insecure leaders are more likely to be seen to start and continue border wall construction.

The Fortification Dilemma: Border Control and Rebel Violence

“…Finally, as borders harden globally, a growing literature examines the political economy of border security. To date, most work has focused on the macrolevel determinants of enforcement (Carter and Poast, 2017;Linebarger and Braithwaite, 2022). This paper bolsters scholarship on the microlevel consequences of fortification, and especially on the effects of border hardening on conflict (Avdan and Gelpi, 2017).…”

“…9 Figure 1 depicts the construction timeline and the total num-9 US-led fortification focused on interdicting insurgent resources (Skirlo, 2007). Yet, barriers may also bolster regime support or shape population movements (Linebarger and Braithwaite, 2022). Walls in Baghdad and Fallujah aimed ber of forts built along Iraqi borders.…”

Wall-building policy: nationalist space management and borderphobia as right-wing populists' tools for doing authoritarian politics

“…These walls can only serve as political tools for populist leaders, but their deterrent effect on subsequent waves of migrants is highly questionable (Avdan et al, 2023). Moreover, the example of PiS leaders has confirmed the results of the analyses that national party leaders at risk of losing office are usually incentivised to implement popular policies, such as border wall construction, hoping that doing so will prompt a domestic rally effect (Linebarger and Braithwaite, 2022). Fortunately, this mechanism is not always effective, as shown by the history of Poland ruled by the PiS party.…”

No Entry in a Pandemic: Public Support for Border Closures

“…All in all, we still know little. Below, we introduce a framework that centers on uncertainty after an outbreak, from which we derive 7 Others have examined the building of more durable border installations (Carter and Poast 2017;Hassner and Wittenberg 2015;Linebarger and Braithwaite 2022) or patterns of visa restrictions (Neumayer 2006), but their arguments do not travel well to pandemic emergency contexts. Gülzau (2021) presents descriptive statistics about temporary border closures and controls in the states of the Schengen Area over a period that includes the COVID-19 pandemic.…”