Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?

Ginsburg, Tom; Versteeg, Mila

doi:10.1093/jleo/ewt008

Cited by 131 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 30 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…21 Using a large global dataset, the authors do not find significant empirical evidence for the diffusion of constitutional review. This contradicts the general argument that international diffusion must not be neglected when explaining institutional innovation in the context of democratization.…”

Section: Integrating Two Theories: Diffusion and Strategic Actionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Institutional Diffusion, Strategic Insurance, and the Creation of West African Constitutional Courts

Stroh¹,

Heyl²

2015

comp polit

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Section: Integrating Two Theories: Diffusion and Strategic Actionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Institutional Diffusion, Strategic Insurance, and the Creation of West African Constitutional Courts

Stroh¹,

Heyl²

2015

comp polit

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“…8 Similar arguments have explained national-level judicial independence as "political insurance" (Epperly 2013;Ginsburg and Versteeg 2014;Ramseyer 1994). These are expected benefits and costs in the future that accrue depending on whether or not incumbent groups maintain political power.…”

Section: The Role Of Political Competitionmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…The more deeply institutionalized reforms are in local government, the more likely ruling party politicians and supporters are to be able to benefit by utilizing transparency mechanisms-as a means of accessing government information and monitoring those in power-in the future should they lose power. 8 Similar arguments have explained national-level judicial independence as "political insurance" (Epperly 2013;Ginsburg and Versteeg 2014;Ramseyer 1994). Further, if incumbents do lose power, then a greater share of the costs, risks, and constraints imposed by access to information will be borne by their opponents who took their place.…”

Section: The Role Of Political Competitionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Sunlight or Window Dressing? Local Government Compliance with South Africa's Promotion of Access to Information Act

Berliner

2016

Governance

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Institutional reforms often face challenges of poor compliance and implementation at the local level. I analyze these in a context where weak state capacity and limited enforcement make widespread compliance unlikely. South Africa's 2000 Promotion of Access to Information Act tasked the South African Human Rights Commission with monitoring and promoting compliance, but with limited resources and no authority to sanction. I argue that local political competition can generate endogenous incentives for compliance, even under conditions of weak capacity and limited external enforcement. Using data on 234 South African municipalities over 10 years, I find higher levels of compliance among more politically competitive municipalities. The results are not simply a function of differences between African National Congress–governed municipalities and others, and are robust to numerous controls for different forms of local state capacity.

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“…As late as 1942, only the United States and Norway authorized judicial bodies to declare national laws void for unconstitutionality (Guarneri and Pederzoli, ). By 2011, though, “83% of the worlds constitutions [gave] courts the power to supervise implementation of the constitution and to set aside legislation for constitutional incompatibility” (Ginsburg, :587; see also Hirschl, ; Gardbaum, ).…”

Section: Majority Rule Minority Rights and Judicial Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Courts and Issue Attention in Canada

Conway

Jordan

Ura

2018

Social Science Quarterly

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Objective To inform international discourse about judicial countermajoritarianism, we assess whether decisions enhancing gay rights by Canadian courts increase the media's attention to homosexuality and related topics. Method We first collect a data set of monthly counts of relevant articles published in two prominent Canadian newspapers and then estimate Markov‐switching models to evaluate whether increases in media attention to homosexuality are coincident with judicial decisions enhancing gay rights in Canada. Results Each of five landmark gay rights decisions is coincident with a period of heightened media attention to homosexuality. The data show that Canadian newspapers publish nearly twice as many relevant stories during these “active” regimes compared to “inactive” periods. Conclusion Canadian courts can increase attention to issues in the national media. This result supports a dynamic view of the interaction between courts and democratic majorities in place of the static view of democracy endemic to normative discourse about judicial countermajoritarianism.

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Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?

Cited by 131 publications

References 30 publications

Institutional Diffusion, Strategic Insurance, and the Creation of West African Constitutional Courts

Institutional Diffusion, Strategic Insurance, and the Creation of West African Constitutional Courts

Sunlight or Window Dressing? Local Government Compliance with South Africa's Promotion of Access to Information Act

Courts and Issue Attention in Canada

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