Why do conflict-generated diasporas pursue sovereignty-based claims through state-based or transnational channels? Armenian, Albanian and Palestinian diasporas in the UK compared

Abstract

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Diaspora mobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction: contextual and comparative dimensions

“…The study of causal mechanisms has been put on the map of scholarship, but needs more theoretical rigour. Causal mechanisms -such as brokerage, framing, ethnic outbidding, lobbying, coalition-building, diffusion, and scale shift -have been primarily applied from social movement theories to diaspora mobilisation studies (Koinova 2011(Koinova , 2014Adamson 2013;Adamson and Koinova 2013;Godin 2018;Godwin 2018;Koinova and Karabegovic 2017). It would be further beneficial to scholarship to trace the exact causal pathways in which those causal mechanisms concatenate to develop processes.…”

“…The book sought to challenge simplistic notions that diasporas are either moderate or radical actors, and brought empirical evidence that they can be both. In the book's aftermath, scholarship grew exponentially to emphasise that there is no direct relationship between conflict-generated diasporas and their conflict-prone agency, but that conditions, causal mechanisms, and processes of diaspora mobilisation need to be deeply scrutinised (Mavroudi 2008;Orjuela 2008;Brinkerhoff 2009Brinkerhoff , 2011Brinkerhoff , 2016Koinova 2009Koinova , 2011Koinova , 2014Lyons and Mandaville 2010;Carling, Erdal, and Horst 2012;Adamson 2013;Horst 2013;Karabegovic 2014;Cochrane 2015;Abramson 2017). Comparative work began to emerge, primarily in illustrative ways, drawing empirical evidence from the same diaspora in different countries, and theoretically emphasising diaspora agency (Brinkerhoff 2016) and possibilities and limits to diaspora cooperation (Carment and Sadjied 2017).…”

“…To counterbalance a trend to see diasporas as only conflict-prone actors, other arguments emerged showing that they can be engaged in peace processes (Smith and Stares 2007;Orjuela 2008), international development (Kapur 2004;Newland and Patrick 2004;Brinkerhoff 2008), and post-conflict reconstruction (Kleist 2008;Hall and Kostic 2009;Koinova 2011;Karabegovic 2014;Hall 2016). Driven by particularistic identities, diasporas nevertheless mobilise as transnational social movements, acting on political opportunities and constraints (Wayland 2004;Koinova 2014), and using brokerage, framing, ethnic outbidding, lobbying, coalitionbuilding, diffusion, and scale shift among other causal mechanisms (Koinova 2011(Koinova , 2014Adamson 2013;Adamson and Koinova 2013;Koinova and Karabegovic 2017). With the increasing importance of social media, diasporas also engage in both online and offline politics (Brinkerhoff 2009;Moss 2016).…”

“…Diasporas linked to states with full domestic and international sovereignty are more likely to endorse civic democratisation practices than those linked to states experiencing contested sovereignty (Koinova 2009). De facto states, seeking international state recognition, could be pressured by international organisations to make statements to incorporate diasporas abroad on a civic principle, but they are more prone actually to engage only diasporas of their dominant nationality, since state sovereignty processes have not been completed, as in the Kosovo case (Koinova 2014). Diaspora individuals can also become engaged in civic activism when natural-and human-caused disasters take place in countries of origin and temporarily unite different ethnic and sectarian groups abroad, and upon altruistic or utilitarian interests of certain diaspora entrepreneurs to advance a civic creed (Koinova, Karabegovic, and Kadhum 2016).…”

Sustained vs episodic mobilization among conflict-generated diasporas

“…A few scholars of transnational diaspora politics have used political opportunity structures and framing mechanisms (Adamson, 2013;Koinova, 2011;Sökefeld, 2006;Wayland, 2004). In previous work I employed these notions to understand comparatively how diasporas mobilize through different channels (state-based vs transnational) (Koinova, 2014a(Koinova, , 2014b. Here I focus on sustained vs episodic mobilization.…”