Why Constitution is Not Identity

Baker, Lynne Rudder

doi:10.2307/2564596

Cited by 273 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…So its existence depends not only on the piece of marble, but also on its context. As this example reveals, constitution is a relation of unity without identity (Baker 1997(Baker , 2000(Baker , 2007. The unity of constitution is usually taken to consist in material (and therefore spatial) coincidence of the constituted object and the constituting object.…”

Section: Spatial Coincidence and Enactmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The location problem in social ontology

Hindriks

2011

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mental, mathematical, and moral facts are difficult to accommodate within an overall worldview due to the peculiar kinds of properties inherent to them. In this paper I argue that a significant class of social entities also presents us with an ontological puzzle that has thus far not been addressed satisfactorily. This puzzle relates to the location of certain social entities. Where, for instance, are organizations located? Where their members are, or where their designated offices are? Organizations depend on their members for their existence, but the members of an organization can be where the organization is not. The designated office of an organization, however, need be little more than a mailbox. I argue that the problem can be solved by conceptualizing the relation between social entities and non-social entities as one of constitution, a relation of unity without identity. Constituted objects have properties that cannot be reduced to properties of the constituting objects. Thus, my attempt to solve the Location Problem results in an argument in favor of a kind of non-reductive materialism about the social.Keywords Constitution · Constitutive rule · Location · Organization · Non-reductive individualism · Normative power · Social ontology · Status Mathematical, mental, and moral facts are difficult to accommodate within an overall worldview. Mathematical entities present an ontological puzzle to philosophers because they are abstract. How the relation between mental and physical properties should be conceptualized is complicated by qualia because of their inherently subjective phenomenology. And the moral domain resists reduction, many believe,

show abstract

Section: Spatial Coincidence and Enactmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

The location problem in social ontology

Hindriks

2011

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…10 Of course, some strong pluralists have made claims from which it follows (given that, as they think, modal predication is constant). Thus Baker (1997) affirms (a) that it is a de dicto necessary truth that all statues are products of intentional activity and (b) that anything which is (not only a statue but) non-derivatively a statue (in a sense she introduces) is necessarily a statue. But she does not explicitly consider the consequence, that the number of material things with a particular intrinsic microphysical make-up (and hence the same Kripkean origin) will vary with the presence or absence of intentional activity external to the region in which that makeup is instantiated.…”

mentioning

confidence: 51%

Against Strong Pluralism

Noonan

2015

Philosophia

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…If a defense of Minimalism requires a criticism of the Twoist's metaphysics (even on a very general basis), then Minimalism is bound to draw on philosophical resources and positions at 17 This example, of the sort levied by Baker (1997), is discussed in Olson (2001). 18 The Indiscernibility Problem, as I have presented it here, is by no means an Oneist clincher.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Minimalism and Coincidence: Comments on Varzi

Slater

2005

Dialectica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Achille Varzi [2000] has suggested a nice response to the familiar argument purporting to establish the existence of perfectly coinciding objects -objects which, if they existed, would trouble mereological extensionality and the "Minimalist View" of ontology. The trick is to defend Minimalism without tarnishing its status as a meta-principle: that is, without making any firstorder ontological claims. Varzi's response, though seeming to allow for a comfortable indifference about metaphysical matters peripheral to Minimalism, is not general enough to stave off attacks on extensionality from more sophisticated corners. However, Varzi's argument bears a kinship with a more general argument against coincident objects. I consider how such an argument sits with the meta-doctrinal status of Minimalism.The Cat and the Catstuff I want you to consider first off, without preface or context, two questions: (I) Can a cat survive the loss of its tail? and (II) Can a certain quantity of stuff survive the loss of any of its parts? A natural answer -one that accords with so-called "ordinary intuitions" -calls for mereological essentialism regarding quantities of stuff but denies that doctrine when it comes to cats. Such a stance, however, leaves the door open to a well-known argument for the existence of perfectly coinciding objects, the existence of which runs contrary to other ordinary intuitions. 1Cast the argument like so: Let 'Tibbles' name a certain cat and 'Tib+Tail' name the mereological sum of Tibbles' body and her tail -or if you like, the quantity of "catstuff " or collection of simples, out of which Tibbles is made. According to our natural stance: (1) Tibbles can survive loss of its tail, (2) Tib+Tail cannot survive loss of its tail. But then there is a property which Tibbles has and Tib+Tail lacks: Tibbles, but not Tib+Tail can survive loss of a tail. So they must be distinct. If the argument is sound, Vol. 57, N o 3 (2003), pp. 323-329 † Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York; Email: matthew.slater@ columbia.edu 1 The questions of whether this stance is natural or whether there is at bottom any sense to such a compliment are quite beside the point here. I mean to use "natural" only as a convenient label. The important question is how this stance troubles mereological extensionality. Dialectica

show abstract

Why Constitution is Not Identity

Cited by 273 publications

References 0 publications

The location problem in social ontology

The location problem in social ontology

Against Strong Pluralism

Minimalism and Coincidence: Comments on Varzi

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About