Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change

Abstract

Why do agents comply with the norms embedded in regimes and international institutions? Scholars have proposed two competing answers to this compliance puzzle, one rationalist, the other constructivist. Rationalists emphasize coercion, cost/benefit calculations, and material incentives; constructivists stress social learning, socialization, and social norms. Both schools, however, explain important aspects of compliance. To build a bridge between them, I examine the role of argumentative persuasion and social learning. This makes explicit the theory of social choice and interaction implicit in many constructivist compliance studies, and it broadens rationalist arguments about the instrumental and noninstrumental processes through which actors comply. I argue that domestic politics—in particular, institutional and historical contexts—delimit the causal role of persuasion/social learning, thus helping both rationalists and constructivists to refine the scope of their compliance claims. To assess the plausibility of these arguments, I examine why states comply with new citizenship/membership norms promoted by European regional organizations.

Treaty Compliance and Violation

“…Others argue that norms will be more or less influential depending on how they mesh with domestic norms and institutions (Checkel 2001). The idea that mass publics might play a role in the socialization of governments to comply with their international agreements is central to Ideational theories have also been advanced linking democratic forms of domestic governance to better international law compliance.…”

Re-thinking FATF: an experimentalist interpretation of the Financial Action Task Force

“…Participation also is key to Bdemocratic destabilization,^a process whereby deliberative rule-making renders formerly technocratic and closed processes accessible to Ba wider range of information, experience, and argument^ [36,37]. Democratic destabilization helps dislodge participants' pre-existing understandings of cause and effect, which minimizes the positive feedback effect of existing institutions and therefore promotes learning [38]. Broader participation also promotes more dynamic forms of accountability, enmeshing decisionmakers in a denser web of domestic and international oversight [36].…”

The Creation of the Multilateral Trade Court: Design and Experiential Learning

“…In order to play a constructive role, early on in the negotiations it supported an enhanced role of mediation within dispute settlement processes and the introduction of non- 4 It is important to note in this regard that the concept of experiential learning we use is different from the strict usage of (Bayesian) learning and updating in most of the game-theoretical literature. In game theory, preferences are stable and actors will only use (updated) information to alter (negotiation) strategies (for a discussion see Checkel 2001). compulsory arbitration procedures.…”