Why Being Necessary Really Is Not the Same As Being Not Possibly Not

Goswick, Dana

doi:10.1007/s12136-014-0244-6

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“…7 Some, for instance, worry that n-entities are metaphysically impossible. Goswick (2015) dispels this worry. 8 Quine famously rejected the "metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian essentialism" (1953,174) and the de re modality he took to lead to it.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

Goswick

2018

Metaphysics

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The view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the more common view that ordinary objects are composed of only material parts ("matter only"). On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue (matter-m + statue-form), a lump (matter-m + lump-form), and/or a mere aggregate (matter-m + mere aggregate-form) exist? I defend a novel answer to the hard question for hylomorphism. In particular, I argue that which ordinary objects exist depends, in part, on how subjects respond to the matter they encounter. I argue that, with regard to grounding the existence and modal properties of ordinary objects, response-dependent hylomorphism is superior to both matter only views and to non-response-dependent versions of hylomorphism.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It doesn't follow that o is necessarily colored, it only follows that, if o ceases being colored, o must also cease being red. 11 See Goswick (2015), Goswick (2018a), andGoswick (2018b). 12 One might reject n-entities, but accept other "minimally modal" objects such as Heller's 4D hunks of matter (Heller 1990) or Jubien's stuff (Jubien 1993).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

Goswick

2018

Metaphysics

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Why Being Necessary Really Is Not the Same As Being Not Possibly Not

Cited by 1 publication

References 4 publications

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

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