Why Bare Demonstratives Need Not Semantically Refer

Smit, J. P.

doi:10.1353/cjp.2012.0000

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…A similar methodological preference has recently been expressed by J.P. Smit (). However, his focus is somewhat different, and I disagree with most of what he has to say about demonstrative reference.…”

supporting

confidence: 68%

The Communication Desideratum and Theories of Indexical Reference

Åkerman

2015

Mind & Language

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PreprintThis is the submitted version of a paper published in Mind and language.Citation for the original published paper (version of record):Åkerman, J. (2015) The Communication Desideratum and Theories of Indexical Reference. Mind The Communication Desideratum and Theories of Indexical Reference JONAS ÅKERMANAbstract: According to the communication desideratum (CD), a notion of semantic content must be adequately related to communication. In the recent debate on indexical reference, (CD) has been invoked in arguments against the view that intentions determine the semantic content of indexicals and demonstratives (intentionalism). In this paper, I argue that the interpretations of (CD) that these arguments rely on are questionable, and suggest an alternative interpretation, which is compatible with (strong) intentionalism. Moreover, I suggest an approach that combines elements of intentionalism with other subjectivist approaches, and discuss the role of intuitions in theorising about indexical reference.Acknowledgements: Earlier versions of parts of this paper have been presented at seminars, workshops and conferences at Stockholm

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The Communication Desideratum and Theories of Indexical Reference

Åkerman

2015

Mind & Language

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“…The reason why the speaker's intention does not settle utterance meaning is simply that no utterance meaning determination, as presupposed by intentionalists and anti-intentionalists alike, takes place. This result is in accordance with what some theorists have already argued notably in the case of demonstrative reference (see, e.g., Ariel 2002a, b;Pagin 2002;Smit 2012;Heck 2014;Gauker 2015;Åkerman 2015;Bach 2017). Further, in the regular course of interpretation the hearer is concerned with what the speaker presents as her intention.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 92%

Utterance Interpretation and Actual Intentions

Leth

2019

Axiomathes

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In this paper I argue, from the consideration of what I hope is the complete variety of a hearer's approaches to a speaker's utterance, that (1) the speaker's intention does not settle the meaning of her utterance and (2) the hearer does not take a genuine interest in the speaker's actual intention. The reason why the speaker's intention does not settle utterance meaning is simply that no utterance meaning determination, as presupposed by intentionalists and anti-intentionalists alike, takes place. Moreover, in the regular course of interpretation the hearer does not care about the speaker's actual intention, but only about what the speaker presents as her intention: the hearer's goal is to come up with an interpretation which the speaker will accept rather than an interpretation which corresponds to the speaker's intention. In cases of accountability, suspicion and lying, the speaker's actual intention is irrelevant; it is at most the speaker's hypothetical intention which is at stake.

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“…On the non-referentialist view-defended by Bach (2006), Smit (2012), Heck (2014), Nowak (2016) and Leth (2020)-demonstratives have no semantically determined referent, even upon a typical occasion of use, and hence utterances that include them have no truth-evaluable, semantically determined propositional content. While demonstratives do have a linguistic meaning, this does not sufficeeven in a specific context of use-to determine semantic reference or content.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Much of what is said by these authors about the relevant cognitive processes would survive, and remain interesting, if their views are recast as nonreferentialist.18 In my original defense of non-referentialism(Smit, 2012), I argue that the idea of conventions that make reference to matters like common ground and salience fails on two separate grounds. Firstly, it clashes with the constraint that we can expect linguistic conventions to be efficient.…”

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Game Theory and Demonstratives

Smit

2023

Erkenn

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This paper argues, based on Lewis’ claim that communication is a coordination game (Lewis in Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 3–35, 1975), that we can account for the communicative function of demonstratives without assuming that they semantically refer. The appeal of such a game theoretical version of the case for non-referentialism is that the communicative role of demonstratives can be accounted for without entering the cul de sac of trying to construct conventions of ever-increasing complexity. Instead communication via demonstratives is explained with reference to the general, non-domain specific ability of human beings to solve games of coordination. Furthermore, there is empirical support for such a view. Judgments concerning demonstrative reference have been shown to be sensitive to judgments concerning common ground (Clark et al. in J Verb Learn Verb Behav 22:245–258, 1983), which is exactly what the non-referentialist account would predict. The game theoretical account also allows for an intuitively plausible, non-referentialist treatment of Speaks’ ‘trumping argument’ (Speaks in Philos Stud 174:709–734, 2017), as well as the Carnap/Agnew puzzle (Kaplan in Syntax Semant 9:221–43, 1970).

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Why Bare Demonstratives Need Not Semantically Refer

Cited by 6 publications

References 18 publications

The Communication Desideratum and Theories of Indexical Reference

The Communication Desideratum and Theories of Indexical Reference

Utterance Interpretation and Actual Intentions

Game Theory and Demonstratives

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