Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research1

Abstract

This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to bring it into existence. This contribution argues that research on bodiless dreams, asomatic out-of-body experiences, and full-body illusions has the potential to make decisive future contributions. Further items on the proposed list of novel research targets include differentiating the concept of a “first-person perspective” on the subcognitive level; investigating relevant phenomenological and neurofunctional commonalities between mind-wandering and dreaming; comparing the functional depth of embodiment across dream and wake states; and demonstrating that the conceptual consequences of cognitive corruption and systematic rationality deficits in the dream state are much more serious for philosophical epistemology (and, perhaps, the methodology of dream research itself) than commonly assumed. The paper closes by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between dream research and philosophy of mind.

Mind-wandering is unguided attention: accounting for the “purposeful” wanderer

“…Think of the stereotypical mindwandering professor who walks headlong into a pole, for example. Others hold that our minds wander only when we are fully awake, even if there are similarities between mind-wandering and dreaming or hypnagogic thought (the state of awareness immediately before sleep; Christoff et al 2011;Metzinger 2013b).…”

Emerging Phenomenological and Biological Principles of Consciousness: Top Insights of Prevailing Models, Concepts, and Observations

“…Revonsuo may have been the first to use a metaphor of virtual reality to describe such an internal simulation [2]. Many of the world-simulation models point to dreaming as strong evidence of the brain's ability produce its own subjective experiential reality [2] [8] [32] [46], with 90% of dreams being experienced as real within a spatially extended virtual reality [47] [48]. Nightmares likely serve as a defense mechanism to simulate dangerous situations in order to practice escaping from these situations such as running from a bear [49].…”

Sny, świadomość i jaźń: perspektywa filozoficzna

“…Można ją uznać za fenomenologicznie minimalną jaźń, czyli najprostszą, najbardziej zredukowaną formę odczuwania siebie jako "ja". Ta propozycja rozszerza istniejące badania nad pełną iluzją i OBE (doświadczeniem bycia poza ciałem -przypis tłumaczki) (Lenggenhager et al 2007;Blanke & Metzinger 2009;Metzinger 2013 1 ), wskazując, że zintegrowany, interdyscyplinarny program badawczy nad snami i iluzją całkowitą może stać się obiecującym projektem na przyszłość. Badanie fenomenologiczne minimalnej jaźni w snach, ale też bardziej skomplikowanych form samodoświadczenia obejmujących wrażenie bycia istotą cielesną, może też pomóc w wyjaśnieniu konkretnego wariantu problemu ciało-i-umysł: nazywam to "problemem ciało-mózg-ciało", czyli zagadnieniem, jak cielesne doświadczenia w snach oraz na jawie można rozumieć jako powstające ze zmiennych, przypadkowych interakcji między mózgiem i resztą ciała (Dreaming, rozdział 8).…”