Why and How Should the European Union Defend its Values?

Abstract

This article provides a normative framework for evaluating the moral permissibility of various defences of European Union (EU) values against their violation in EU member states. This requires, first, a coherent interpretation of EU values as the values of liberal democracy; second, a clear notion of when they are violated; third, a theory of how liberal democracy can be defended with measures that are consistent with the values of liberal democracy themselves; and, finally, a discussion of what the EU’s role is in this defence. The article argues that it would be permissible for the EU to combine a number of political, cultural, socio-economic and legal responses in a concentric defence of liberal democracy as long as they respect the separation of powers doctrine and do not rely on problematic notions of collective responsibility.

Saving Popular Sovereignty From a Slow Death in the European Union

“…This analysis will not focus on procedural norms. As a democratic principle, shared popular sovereignty requires that implementation, formulation and enforcement are compatible with procedural principles, such as impartiality (Bellamy and Kröger, 2021), democratic equality (Theuns, 2020) and the separation of powers (Olsen, 2022b). This is not to say that other interpretations of these values or other values, such as neutrality, might not also be compatible with this democratic principle.…”

“…Most normative studies assess the democratic legitimacy of EU interventions, such as the Article 7 procedure and expulsion (e.g., Olsen, 2022a; Patberg, 2020, 2021; Theuns, 2022) or other important procedural considerations of EU democracy protection (Bellamy and Kröger, 2021; Theuns, 2020). As far as I am aware, only Olsen (2022b) offers a comprehensive moral framework for assessing EU interventions, although this somewhat surprisingly does not include the legitimacy of expelling an autocratic member state (although he does address this elsewhere, Olsen, 2022a). Whilst these scholars contribute important normative assessments, they often take for granted the EU's normative authority to intervene or refer to articles in the Treaties.…”

“…Several scholars argue that militant democracy provides the EU with the political authority to engage in democracy protection (e.g., Müller, 2016; Wagrandl, 2018). In a different vein, Olsen (2022b) uses the theory of militant democracy to theorize legitimate interventions. However, democracy protection involves more than denying rights to ideological opponents of democracy such as by banning antidemocratic parties; hence, militant democracy is arguably too specific to theorize EU democracy protection.…”

“…Most importantly, militant democracy requires agreement on the existence of a liberal democratic order (Wagrandl, 2018). These scholars ground this claim with reference to existing institutions and historical considerations (Müller, 2016; Olsen, 2022b; Wagrandl, 2018). They thus do not provide a principle for theorizing the EU's normative political authority in the first place.…”

“…Here, I analyse the democratic legitimacy of three types of measures: discursive, economic and political. Other categorizations have been proposed (e.g., Olsen, 2022b), but these three types cover the most realistic options currently being undertaken or seriously considered. My analysis assesses their compatibility or lack thereof with the desideratum of protecting Europe's peoples.…”