Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds

Presti, Patrizio Lo

doi:10.1177/0959354316650943

Cited by 2 publications

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References 48 publications

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“…Perceiving others respond the way you would is seeing them think and feel like you in the shared milieu (Rietveld, 2012a, 2012b; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). More radically, perhaps, it has been suggested that DPT allows for perception of collective states of mind (Lo Presti, 2016b, p. 425). Considering that some behavioral responses in a shared social environment (e.g., religious or economic) are responses to objects and events (e.g., holy or monetary objects and events) collectively intended to play significant social or institutional roles (e.g., Searle, 2010, 2015), behavioral responses can reveal collective attitudes.…”

Section: The Oppositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Leave inference alone: Direct inferential social cognition

Presti

2020

Theory & Psychology

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Direct perception and theory–theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This article argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one in which both sides can be right. The argument, then, is that inferentialism should not be called on to witness in favor or disfavor of advocates of either direct or indirect social cognition.

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Section: The Oppositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This Sellars–Gibson connection is picked up, very briefly, by McDowell in a footnote of Mind and World (1994, p. 10). To my knowledge, it has otherwise passed unnoticed (but see Lo Presti, 2016b).…”

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confidence: 97%

Leave inference alone: Direct inferential social cognition

Presti

2020

Theory & Psychology

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Persons and Affordances

Presti

2019

Ecological Psychology

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Interdisciplinary interest in affordances is increasing. This paper is a philosophical contribution. The question is: Do persons offer affordances? Analysis of the concepts 'person' and 'affordance' supports an affirmative answer. On a widely accepted understanding of what persons are, persons exhibit many of the features typical of socionormative affordances. However, to understand persons as offering affordances requires, on the face of it, stretching traditional understandings of the concept of affordance: persons, in contrast to the organisms that partially constitute persons, do not seem to be available to perception. This and similar worries are responded to. The environment for an individual is filled with animate features, and prominent among them are persons. That being the case, a full accounting of environmental perception would by necessity include consideration of the information and the processes underlying person perception.-Heft, 2007, p. 86 (emphases added). Two great theorists of the mid 20 th century help us think of persons as offering affordances for socionormative interaction. They are James J. Gibson and Wilfrid Sellars. To my knowledge, few have considered the possibility that two theorist, as opposed in interests as these, have a common lesson to tell. J. J. Gibson is a de-mentalizer of intelligence and perceptuomotor capacities. On his approach to capacities for intelligent environmental engagements, mediating inferences are taken out of the picture (e.g., 1979, p. 127; Lobo et al., 2018, p. 2). Sellars, in contrast, is a denier of direct perceptual (or empirical) givenness. Knowing and agency is for him necessarily inferential. Indeed, he spent large parts of his opus classicus (1956) to bury the "Myth of the Given." The myth as he conceived it is the possibility of direct non-inferential knowledge. Thus it seems that Gibsonian ecological psychology cannot account for knowledge or agency from Sellars's inferentialist point of view. Whether this is an apparent or real opposition is discussed in the concluding section (see also footnote 1). Adverse as J. J. Gibson and Sellars seemthe first, a radical empiricist (1967), advocating non-inferential direct perception and agency, the latter attacking radical

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Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds

Cited by 2 publications

References 48 publications

Leave inference alone: Direct inferential social cognition

Leave inference alone: Direct inferential social cognition

Persons and Affordances

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