Whose Mind Matters More—The Agent or the Artist? An Investigation of Ethical and Aesthetic Evaluations

Abstract

Theory of mind, the capacity for reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions, represents a critical input to ethical and aesthetic evaluations. Did the agent cause harm on purpose? Were those brushstrokes intentional? The current study investigates theory of mind for moral and artistic judgments within the same paradigm. In particular, we target the role of intent for two kinds of judgments: “objective” judgments of quality and “subjective” judgments of preference or liking. First, we show that intent matters more for objective versus subjective judgments in the case of ethics and aesthetics. Second, we show that, overall, intent matters more for ethical versus aesthetic evaluations. These findings suggest that an “objective-subjective” dimension describes judgments across both domains, and that observers assign more weight to the mind of the moral agent than the mind of the artist when making the relevant evaluations.

What Gaze Fixation and Pupil Dilation Can Tell Us About Perceived Differences Between Abstract Art by Artists Versus by Children and Animals

“…This finding might show that when thinking about what is preferred, participants considered the pleasingness of the image, but when thinking about which one was better, pleasingness was less important as a factor. This finding provides further support for the claim that preferences and quality judgments are different kinds of aesthetic responses (Hawley-Dolan & Winner, 2011; Hawley-Dolan & Young, 2013).…”

“…The difference in fixation time in response to quality versus preference judgments supports theoretical claims that quality judgments and preferences require different ways of responding: Making a quality judgment is a cognitive response based on an attempt at an objective analysis of the work, while deciding upon a preference is a more automatic affective response (Hagtvedt et al., 2008; Hawley-Dolan & Winner, 2011; Hawley-Dolan & Young, 2013; Leder et al., 2004; Zajonc, 1980).…”

Creation in judgments about the establishment of ownership

“…People are more likely to view objects as creations when they are made intentionally, rather than unintentionally (Bloom, 1996;Bloom & Markson, 1998;Diesdendruck, Markson, & Bloom, 2003;Gelman & Ebeling, 1998; also see Hawley-Dolan & Young, 2013). For example, children and adults refer to a bear-shaped blob of paint as a "bear" if it was painted intentionally, but instead refer to its constituent materials (i.e., "paint") if it was created accidentally (Gelman & Ebeling, 1998).…”

An Actor's Knowledge and Intent Are More Important in Evaluating Moral Transgressions Than Conventional Transgressions

“…Our findings raise a number of important questions for future research. First, how do our findings relate to prior work (Barrett et al, 2016;Chakroff et al, 2015;Hawley-Dolan & Young, 2013;Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011;Young & Saxe, 2011), which documents a weaker effect of knowledge and intent in evaluating purity violations, such as incest, relative to harm violations, such as battery? Like conventional transgressions, purity violations differ from moral transgressions in the primary locus of harm.…”

“…Although knowledge and intent often play a central role in moral judgment, recent findings reveal that these mental states are not equally influential in evaluating transgressions of all types (Barrett et al, 2016;Chakroff et al, 2015;Hawley-Dolan & Young, 2013;Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011;Young & Saxe, 2011). This variation is also reflected in the law: For crimes classified as strict liability, such as speeding or statutory rape, the American legal system does not require the presence of mens rea-"a guilty mind"-for a defendant's conviction.…”