Whose Mandate? Policy Promises, Strong Bicameralism and Polled Opinion

Goot, Murray

doi:10.1080/10361149950263

Cited by 14 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The use of the corporations power by the Howard government to implement national industrial relations regulation, and the forceful approval by the HCA, are a mirror image of the 1973 case. Arguably, the Work Choices laws chal-lenged democratic principles, if the concept of the specific mandate applies in Australia (see Goot, 1999). The Howard government's 2004 federal election industrial relations policy restricted a re-elected Coalition to investigate ways to harmonize federal and State laws to reduce complexity, streamline the agreement making process, encourage workplace mediation, further simplify awards and reform unfair dismissal procedures (Liberal-National Parties, 2004).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatism, Principles and Policy: Federalism and Industrial Relations Regulation in Australia

Lyons

Khoshaba

2009

Journal of Industrial Relations

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Traditionally, industrial relations in Australia have been governed by a dual system of federal and State regulation. In recent decades there have been two attempts to create a single national system of industrial relations regulation. In 1973, the Whitlam (Australian Labor Party) government proposed two constitutional alteration referendum questions to give the federal parliament plenary law making powers over 'prices' and 'incomes', and consequently industrial relations. In 2005, the Howard (Liberal-National parties coalition) government used the existing constitutional law making powers of the federal parliament, the corporations power, to widen the coverage of the federal industrial relations system with the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) to capture about 85 percent of Australian employees. This article compares and contrasts these two efforts to create a national industrial relations system. The analysis shows that both efforts illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of federalism generally and suggests the political nature of industrial relations policy in Australia remain regardless of the regulatory jurisdiction.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatism, Principles and Policy: Federalism and Industrial Relations Regulation in Australia

Lyons

Khoshaba

2009

Journal of Industrial Relations

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“…It was not a party that represented specific sectional interests and sought to deliver benefits for that sectional interest (State aid to nongovernment schools might be the sole exception, see Costar and Strangio 2004). Generally, voters will support a party if they believe its priorities are consistent with their own, an 'ideological proximity' in other words, and not necessarily because of specific policies (Goot 1999;van der Burg 2002). The partially alienated segment of the electorate that voted DLP as an expression of an anti-communist ideology could just as easily drift back to the ALP as it modified its policies under Whitlam's leadership and as the domestic and international communist threat receded, or drift to the Coalition (Allan 1988, 31-2).…”

Section: The Democratic Labor Party and Its Legacy 431mentioning

confidence: 98%

Defence, the Family and the Battler: The Democratic Labor Party and its Legacy∗

Lyons

2008

Australian Journal of Political Science

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“…Other input factors nonetheless boost perceptions of the Senate's legitimacy, alongside output factors concerning its policy interventions. In debating bicameralism the issue of 'mandate' is central in Australian politics (Goot, 1999). While government claims a mandate to govern unimpeded, elected non-government senators claim a mandate to oppose, particularly on unpopular policies.…”

Section: Australian Bicameralism: Legitimacy Within Limitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking Bicameral Strength: A Three-Dimensional Approach

Russell¹

2013

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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Bicameralism remains a common legislative arrangement, providing a classic potential check on political executives. But this potential is not always realised, leading scholars to ask which factors contribute to bicameralism that is 'strong'. One well-established analysis is that of Arend Lijphart, in his account of majoritarian and consensus democracies. This bases bicameral strength on two dimensions: 'symmetry' of the two chambers' formal powers and 'incongruence' of their composition. Other theorists reason in similar ways. But recent British developments, backed by evidence from other states, expose flaws in this approach. A more convincing theory must be 'three-dimensional', recognising the centrality of perceived legitimacy to bicameral strength. Legitimacy is fundamental to understanding bicameralism, due both to the composition of some second chambers and to the role of all such chambers in challenging democratically elected first chambers. Lijphart did note that legitimacy affected the dynamics of bicameralism, but its role is both more central, and significantly more complex, than he suggested.

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Whose Mandate? Policy Promises, Strong Bicameralism and Polled Opinion

Cited by 14 publications

References 26 publications

Pragmatism, Principles and Policy: Federalism and Industrial Relations Regulation in Australia

Pragmatism, Principles and Policy: Federalism and Industrial Relations Regulation in Australia

Defence, the Family and the Battler: The Democratic Labor Party and its Legacy∗

Rethinking Bicameral Strength: A Three-Dimensional Approach

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