Wholesale-price vs cost-sharing contracts in a green supply chain with reference price effect under different power structures

Zhang, Ranran; Liu, Jinjin; Qian, Yu

doi:10.1108/k-11-2021-1096

Cited by 15 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…The level of product greenness can be reflected in the green design features of the product, such as energy efficiency labels, carbon labels, the content of hazardous substances, and the degree of recyclability of product parts [21].…”

Section: Model Assumptions and Parametric Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Green Design Strategy of Electrical and Electronic Manufacturing Enterprises Based on the Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Si,

Yang,

Shao

2024

Sustainability

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Green design emphasizes the environmental attributes of the product life cycle, which can prevent environmental pollution at the source and reduce resource consumption. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a tripartite game model between “government-electrical and electronic manufacturing companies-consumers”, explores the influence of participants’ strategic choices and parameters on the evolutionary behavior of the three parties in different situations, and uses Matlab software to conduct numerical simulation analysis. Simulation analysis is the process of simulating real-world events and system behavior through computer models to assess, validate, and predict their performance and response. The research results show that the strategic choices of the three parties influence each other and government supervision and green consumption are conducive to incentivizing manufacturing companies to carry out green design. Consumer green preferences, environmental tax rates, corporate recycling revenue, and increases in consumer recycling revenue are all conducive to product design. Compared to environmental taxes, corporate subsidy policies have a greater impact on the behavior of the government, manufacturing companies, and consumers. Compared to consumer subsidies, corporate subsidy policies have a more significant effect on the behavior of governments and manufacturing companies, while for consumers, the opposite is true.

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Section: Model Assumptions and Parametric Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Green Design Strategy of Electrical and Electronic Manufacturing Enterprises Based on the Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Si,

Yang,

Shao

2024

Sustainability

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“…Another topic related to our paper is cost sharing problem in supply chains [25][26][27]. This body of literature can be divided into two categories: one is concerned with contract selection between revenue sharing and cost sharing in supply chains; the second is cost sharing under different supply chain backgrounds, including closed-loop supply chains, green supply chains, and dual-channel supply chains.…”

Section: Quality Improvements and Cost Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this section, we employ numerical analysis to illustrate the results more intuitively. According to the related literature [14,27,34] and the constraint conditions of Section 4, the parameter settings are as follows: a H = 500, a L = 200, δ = 0.5, θ = 2, λ = 1, c f = 10, c g = 6, μ = 100, η = 0.1, and ϕ = 0.2. We subsequently explore the impacts of key parameters δ, μ, ϕ, and η on the quality improvement and the three members' expected profits.…”

Section: Numerical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of cost sharing on quality improvement and profits under uncertain demand: The case of a textile and garment supply chain

Lang,

Hu,

Liu

2024

PLoS ONE

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The study explores the strategic pricing and quality improvement decisions under uncertain demand in a three-layer textile and garment supply chain. According to whether the fabric manufacturer (FM) invests in quality or not and whether the garment manufacturer (GM) or garment retailer (GR) is willing to share the costs or not, five game models are constructed to investigate the impact of different members’ cost sharing on the optimal decisions and profits. By conducting a theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that: (1) The GM’s or GR’s cost sharing plays a positive effect on the quality improvement, as for whose cost sharing performs better in improving the quality depending on the proportion of cost sharing, and the quality improvement is highest with both members share the costs simultaneously. (2) The FM receives the highest profit when both members share the costs simultaneously, however, whose cost sharing is more profitable for the FM is also related to the proportion of cost sharing; in short, the FM always benefits from the cost sharing, no matter one member does this or two members do this. (3) The GM (GR) gains the highest profit when only the GR (GM) shares the costs, and the results indicate that if one member has shared the costs, whether the other member engaging in cost sharing could benefit the former depending on their proportions. Specifically, when the GM (GR) chooses to share the costs and the proportion is relatively low, the GR(GM) joining in cost sharing is beneficial to the former; otherwise, is harmful.

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“…wholesale price contract and consignment contract. Zhang et al (2022) performed a comparative analysis between wholesale price contract and costsharing contract in a two-level green supply chain model. They looked at which contract is more effective in improving the product's greenness and promoting demand, taking into account the consumer reference pricing effect.…”

Section: Price Discount Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of a single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain with price and green sensitive demand under stochastic lead time

Dash

Giri

Sarkar

2023

Decis. Mak. Appl. Manag. Eng.

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When dealing with uncertainties in the supply chain and ensuring customer satisfaction, efficient management of lead time plays a significant role. Likewise, besides managing inventory and pricing strategies adeptly in multi-retailer supply chains, it has become inevitable for firms to embrace green and sustainable business practices. In this context, this paper considers a two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers in which the manufacturer produces a single product and delivers it to the retailers in equal-sized batches. Each retailer faces a price and green-sensitive market demand. The lead time is assumed to be a random variable that follows a normal distribution. Shortages for retailer inventory are allowed to occur and are completely backlogged. The centralized model and a decentralized model based on the leader-follower Stackelberg gaming approach are developed. A price discount mechanism between the manufacturer and retailers is proposed. For the acceptance of this contract, the upper and lower limits of the price discount rate are established. Numerical outcomes exhibit that the price discount mechanism effectively coordinates the supply chain and enhances both environmental and economical performances. A sensitivity analysis with respect to some key parameters is performed, and certain managerial insights are emphasized.

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Wholesale-price vs cost-sharing contracts in a green supply chain with reference price effect under different power structures

Cited by 15 publications

References 49 publications

Research on Green Design Strategy of Electrical and Electronic Manufacturing Enterprises Based on the Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Research on Green Design Strategy of Electrical and Electronic Manufacturing Enterprises Based on the Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Impact of cost sharing on quality improvement and profits under uncertain demand: The case of a textile and garment supply chain

Coordination of a single-manufacturer multi-retailer supply chain with price and green sensitive demand under stochastic lead time

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