WHO tracking mechanism for IHR additional health measures

Kamradt‐Scott, Adam; Dolea, Carmen; Poncé, Corinne; Rodier, G; Lamunu, Margaret; Drury, Patrick; Ioos, Sophie

doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(18)32068-3

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) officially reported the first cases of H1N1 to WHO on April 18, 2009. On April 29, 2009, WHO convened an emergency committee under the authority of the IHR to make recommendations on whether a pandemic should be declared (Kamradt-Scott et al, 2018). As the cases increased at more than 200 locations around the world, preparations for vaccine production and other responses began.…”

Section: Governance Gaps Exposed In the 2009 H1n1 "Swine Flu" Pandemicmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Apart from its role with vaccine production and distribution, WHO faced criticism over the timing of its declaration of a pandemic (a necessary step to initiate the "switch") and its decision to remove pandemic influenza guidance from its website. Three independent panels found no evidence that WHO had engaged in inappropriate conduct but also recommended significant changes for its responses to health emergencies (Cohen and Carter, 2010;Flynn, 2010;Kamradt-Scott et al, 2018;WHO, 2011).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Countering the Pandemic Threat Through Global Coordination on Vaccines: The Influenza Imperative

Hudson

2022

Journal of Occupational &Amp; Environmental Medicine

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Section: Governance Gaps Exposed In the 2009 H1n1 "Swine Flu" Pandemicmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Countering the Pandemic Threat Through Global Coordination on Vaccines: The Influenza Imperative

Hudson

2022

Journal of Occupational &Amp; Environmental Medicine

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“…The most frequent breech was to deny entry to international travellers. 64 During the COVID-19 pandemic, almost all countries have decided, with good reason, that restrictions on international travel are necessary to prevent the importation of infections, and have therefore restricted visas, closed borders, and imposed quarantine measures. 65 Given the trade-offs between health, economy, sovereignty, and security, and the difficulties of enforcement, it is no surprise that compliance with the IHR 2005 has been poor, compromising the treaty as a mechanism for sharing costs and risks.…”

Section: Health Regulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unlikely disasters

Dye¹

2021

The Great Health Dilemma

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If the threat of disaster—an earthquake, a pandemic, or a nuclear accident—is unlikely or uncertain in time, place, and scale, then prevention may not be seen as better than cure. A potential health emergency becomes more manageable when the cost is commensurate with the hazard and the risk. Tactics to satisfy that criterion are familiar to the insurance industry: spotlight preventable hazards, pool the risks, and share the costs. A hazard—such as COVID-19, Ebola or Zika virus—is perceived to be more dangerous, and more likely to stimulate action, when classified as a public health emergency or a threat to national security. Among the methods for pooling risks and sharing costs are early detection and response systems for multiple pathogens; platform technologies for the development of new diagnostics and vaccines; collaborations through the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005); and shared genomic databases for bacteria and viruses.

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Concealing Disease: Trade and Travel Barriers and the Timeliness of Outbreak Reporting

Worsnop

2019

International Studies Perspectives

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Slow outbreak reporting by states is a key challenge to effectively responding to global health emergencies like Zika, Ebola, and H1N1. Current policy focuses on improving domestic outbreak surveillance capacity globally in order to reduce reporting lags. However, governments also face economic and political incentives to conceal outbreaks, and these incentives largely are ignored in policy discussions. In spite of the policy implications for outbreak response, the “capacity” and “will” explanations have not been systematically examined. Analysis of a dataset coding the timeliness of outbreak reporting from 1996–2014 finds evidence that states’ unwillingness to report—rather than just their inability—leads to delayed reporting. The findings suggest that though building surveillance capacity is critical, doing so may not be sufficient to reduce reporting lags. Policy aimed at encouraging rapid reporting must also mitigate the associated economic and political costs.

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WHO tracking mechanism for IHR additional health measures

Cited by 3 publications

References 4 publications

Countering the Pandemic Threat Through Global Coordination on Vaccines: The Influenza Imperative

Countering the Pandemic Threat Through Global Coordination on Vaccines: The Influenza Imperative

Unlikely disasters

Concealing Disease: Trade and Travel Barriers and the Timeliness of Outbreak Reporting

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