Who's in the cockpit? The political economy of collaborative aircraft decisions

Defeating the Austerians of the warfare state: French arms policy through the lens of the Programmatic Action Framework

“…Second, the typology of the three models of programmatic actors does not make it possible to identify what type of actors take part in this decisional process, leading to the formulation of a fourth model, named the “programmatic clique.” A programmatic clique is a collection of actors characterized both by long‐standing participation in the policy process (such as the programmatic elite and coalition models) and by a low level of socio‐professional homogeneity (like the programmatic team model). In the process, this article demonstrates that the PAF can be useful for studying an object of political economy, incorporating not only bureaucratic ties (Genieys & Michel, 2004, 2005, 2006) and civilian‐military relations (Cohen, 1994; Daho, 2019; DeVore, 2019), but also relations between the state and industry (Faure 2019; DeVore & Weiss, 2014).…”

“…Third, there is an “air force” version and a “naval” version, destined, respectively, for the air force and the navy, two discrete components of the French armed forces. Numerous studies have been made of the European negotiations that ended with the decision by the French state in 1985 to retain the national option of the Rafale to meet the needs of the air force, whereas the German, British, and Italian states chose the European alternative of the Typhoon (DeVore & Weiss, 2014; Droit, 2010; Faure, 2019; Hoeffler & Mérand, 2015; Oldfield, 2000). By contrast, no study—with the exception of a very few empirical analyses (Cohen, 1994:32)—has dealt with the decision taken by the French state in 1998 to acquire the French Rafale, rather than the American F‐18, to supply the navy.…”

“…DeVore and Weiss (2014) deal with this analytical difficulty in describing the movement of arms sector actors between the state and industry by proposing a rational choice institutionalist approach, derived from the school of the varieties of capitalism. The state's decision in favor of the Rafale naval aircraft was determined by a “statist” political economy, which reflected a specific collection of rules, organizations, and market‐regulating institutions produced by the state.…”

“…The state's decision in favor of the Rafale naval aircraft was determined by a “statist” political economy, which reflected a specific collection of rules, organizations, and market‐regulating institutions produced by the state. The rules, organizations, and institutions were used by the state, which was acting with the aim of “maximising the effectiveness of defence industry,” and by defence companies with the goal of “overturning government decisions that differed from their preferences” (DeVore & Weiss, 2014:522). The central hypothesis of the statist political economy model postulates that the close interdependence that ties the state—embodied by the Direction générale de l'armement (DGA) [French government defence procurement agency]—to the defence industry (embodied by Dassault Aviation and Snecma) endows the latter with powerful leverage for shaping the decision making process.…”

In Search of Lost Time: Memory‐framing, Bilateral Identity‐making, and European Security

“…Between 1960 and 1990, it is hard to find a case of core state power sharing that did not result from an initial Franco‐German project. Some failed: the Eurofighter left the Franco‐German orbit when France went its own way with Dassault's Rafale, while the Franco‐German tank project was abandoned (DeVore and Weiss, ; van Oppeln, ). But in a way, the operational impact of even the most powerful bilateral initiatives, such as the Franco‐German Brigade, was of secondary importance.…”