Who’s getting the office? Party dominance and elected executives’ career path

Pastrana, Julio Alberto Ramos

doi:10.1111/kykl.12259

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…As has been shown, changes in remittances can affect voters' behavior (Duquette‐Rury & Chen, 2019; García, 2018; Germano, 2013). Furthermore, Ramos Pastrana (2021) provides evidence that party turnover increased after the 2008 crisis for both competitive and dominant states, and argues that, in line with the literature on political effects on external economic shocks (see Campello & Zucco, 2016), this can be explained by misattribution of responsibilities with respect to the crisis by the Mexican voters. This is supported by data from the Barómetro de las Américas survey, in which almost 60% of interviewees considered the crisis to be related to the current or past Mexican governments.…”

Section: Institutional Settingmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…Recent literature on political science has shown that incumbents' popularity level (Campello & Zucco, 2016; Leigh, 2009; Monteiro & Ferraz, 2010; Tertytchnaya et al, 2018; Wolfers, 2002) is affected by external economic shocks. Importantly, this also holds in the Mexican case (see Ramos Pastrana, 2021, for evidence of the political effect of the 2008 financial crisis on Mexico's subnational elections).…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…My findings have important implications for the costs of party dominance. Previous research has shown that dominant parties might affect performance by biasing elected politicians' profiles (Ramos Pastrana, 2021). This study provides further evidence of the mechanisms through which party dominance might affect governments' performance: bureaucratic overload (see Dasgupta & Kapur, 2020).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hit from abroad: Party dominance and the fiscal response to external economic shocks

Pastrana

2022

Economics & Politics

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Do politicians from dominant parties choose different fiscal policies in response to an external economic shock than politicians from competitive parties? This paper argues that politicians from dominant parties might adopt different fiscal policies than politicians from competitive parties in response to an external economic shock. Politicians from dominant parties might enjoy a political advantage that allows them to underinvest in areas with low political gains compared to politicians from competitive parties and divert the money to policy areas more politically profitable. I examine my theoretical prediction using a panel data set of Mexican governors from 1995 to 2010.

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Section: Institutional Settingmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 86%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hit from abroad: Party dominance and the fiscal response to external economic shocks

Pastrana

2022

Economics & Politics

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“…Party dominance in a state may matter for politicians’ career paths and thus turnout or electoral success (Ramos Pastrana, 2021). Regarding party affiliation of incumbents to the state‐wide dominant, center‐right CSU party, we find that incumbents from parties different than the CSU tend to profit from higher turnout (column 2).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Higher turnout increases incumbency advantages: Evidence from mayoral elections

Frank

Stadelmann

Torgler

2022

Economics & Politics

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We analyze the effect of electoral turnout on incumbency advantages by exploring mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria. Mayors are elected by majority rule in two‐round (runoff) elections. Between the first and second ballot of the mayoral election in March 2020, the state government announced an official state of emergency. In the second ballot, voting in person was prohibited and only postal voting was possible. To construct an instrument for electoral turnout, we use a difference‐in‐differences strategy by contrasting turnout in the first and second ballot in 2020 with the first and second ballots from previous elections. We use this instrument to analyze the causal effect of turnout on incumbent vote shares. A 10‐percentage point increase in turnout leads to a statistically robust 3.4 percentage point higher vote share for incumbent mayors highlighting the relevance of turnout‐related incumbency advantages.

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“…No unambiguous evidence can be found. The contrasting results between federal and local levels of government are taken to illustrate how differences in political competition affect politicians' career path (Pastrana, 2021). As a final contribution, we assess whether the bias is stronger among elected than among non-elected candidates in the 2018 municipal elections.…”

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confidence: 99%

Forever young: Relative age effects in Belgian political selection

Yussef

Heyndels

Boulaire

2023

Kyklos

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Political selection is crucial for the functioning of democracy. However, the practice—in education and sports contexts—of artificially dividing school‐age children into different age groups leads to a considerable bias in this selection. The probability of becoming a (successful) politician depends on individuals' relative age. Being born shortly after the cut‐off date significantly increases the probability that an individual will be politically successful later in life. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find strong evidence of such relative age effect (RAE) among a large sample of Belgian federal parliamentarians over the period 1950–2019 (N = 4032), but not among municipal councillors (N = 7387), nor among municipal candidates (N = 36,740) in the 2018 election. The estimated overrepresentation of federal members of the parliament (MPs) born immediately after the cut‐off date is up to 90% compared to politicians born just before the cut‐off date. The overrepresentation is observed over the whole period and thus seems to be deeply rooted in the political system. We find the RAE to have a gendered dimension: The effect is driven by early‐born male politicians' overrepresentation. No significant RAE was found among female politicians.

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Who’s getting the office? Party dominance and elected executives’ career path

Cited by 10 publications

References 49 publications

Hit from abroad: Party dominance and the fiscal response to external economic shocks

Hit from abroad: Party dominance and the fiscal response to external economic shocks

Higher turnout increases incumbency advantages: Evidence from mayoral elections

Forever young: Relative age effects in Belgian political selection

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