Who's Afraid of the Spoofer? GPS/GNSS Spoofing Detection via Automatic Gain Control (AGC)

Akos, Dennis

doi:10.1002/navi.19

Cited by 206 publications

(99 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Both the power monitor and the correlation-distortion monitor were proposed separately as self-contained anti-spoofing techniques in [7] and [8], respectively. But these approaches, taken independently, are inadequate because of their high false alarm rates.…”

Section: The Distortion-power Tradeoffmentioning

confidence: 99%

A combined symmetric difference and power monitoring GNSS anti-spoofing technique

Wesson

Evans

Humphreys

2013

2013 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing

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Civil Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are vulnerable to spoofing attacks that deceive a victim receiver into reporting counterfeit position or time information. The primary contribution of this paper is a non-cryptographic GNSS anti-spoofing technique that "sandwiches" a spoofer between a correlation function distortion monitor and a total in-band power monitor. The defense exploits the difficulty of mounting an effective spoofing attack that simultaneously maintains a low-enough counterfeit signal power to avoid power monitoring alarms while minimizing distortions of the received crosscorrelation profile that are indicative of a spoofing attack. Results presented in this paper demonstrate the defense's effectiveness against a sophisticated spoofing attack.

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Section: The Distortion-power Tradeoffmentioning

confidence: 99%

A combined symmetric difference and power monitoring GNSS anti-spoofing technique

Wesson

Evans

Humphreys

2013

2013 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing

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“…This could be due to the operation of Automatic Gain Control (AGC) circuitry that provides controlled signal amplitude at its output despite variation of 1 http://egnos-user-support.essp-sas.eu/ the amplitude in the input signal. Though AGC is present in every modern GNSS receiver, nevertheless, if the receiver is not specifically pre-designed to detect radio frequency interference, it will adapt its AGC gain as if there is only thermal Gaussian noise present (Bastide et al 2003;Luo et al 2003;Akos 2012). Since RIMS receivers are used in monitoring the integrity of GNSS Signal in Space (SISE) to support civil aviation users through EGNOS, the receiver is pre-designed to lower the AGC gain in the presence of excessive noise and/or interference to comply with stringent performance requirement …”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance assessment of GPS receivers during the September 24, 2011 solar radio burst event

Muhammad

Alberti

Marassi

et al. 2015

J. Space Weather Space Clim.

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The sudden outburst of in-band solar radio noise from the Sun is recognized as one of the potential Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) sources that directly impact the performance of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers. On September 24, 2011, the solar active region 1302 unleashed a moderate M7.1 soft X-ray flare associated with a very powerful radio burst at 1415 MHz. The Solar Radio Burst (SRB) event spanned over three distinct episodes of solar radio noise emission that reached the maximum radio flux density of 114,144 Solar Flux Units (SFU) at 13:04:46 UTC. This paper analyzes the impact of September 24, 2011 SRB event on the performance of a significant subset of NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers located in the sunlit hemisphere. The performance assessment is carried out in terms of Carrier-to-Noise power spectral density ratio (C/N 0 ) degradation, dual-frequency pseudorange measurements availability, pseudorange residual errors, and dualfrequency positioning errors in the horizontal and vertical dimensions. We observed that during the SRB event the GPS C/N 0 is reduced at most by 13 dB on L1 and 24 dB on L2. The C/N 0 degradation caused the loss of lock on GPS L1 and L2 signals and significant code-tracking errors. We noticed that many stations experienced less than four satellite measurements, which are the minimum required number of measurements for position estimation. The deteriorated satellite-receiver geometry due to loss of signal lock and significant code-tracking errors during the solar radio burst event introduced large positioning errors in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Rise in vertical positioning error of 303 m and rise in horizontal positioning of 55 m could be noticed during the solar radio burst event.

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“…The spoofing interference can be alarmed by monitoring the abnormal variance of the AGC gain level [4]. This method needs the information of AGC gain, so when the receiver only deals with digital intermediate frequency signals, the method can't be implemented.…”

Section: Anti-spoofing Methods In the Signal Processing Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

GNSS Receiver Anti-spoofing Techniques: A Review and Future Prospects

Xiao

Tang

et al. 2016

Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering

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Spoofing interference can mislead a target receiver to report a wrong position and time. This can pose a serious threat to the security of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) applications, and may cause undesirable consequences. As such, anti-spoofing techniques have become a hot research topic within the GNSS discipline. This paper provides a review of recent research in the field of GNSS anti-spoofing on the receiver side. The vulnerability of GNSS receivers to spoofing attacks is studied, and the anti-spoofing algorithms around the base band digital signal processing layer and the information processing layer of the receiver is discussed. The limitation, cost and applicability of these anti-spoofing methods are investigated and the trend of anti-spoofing research in the future is analyzed.

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Who's Afraid of the Spoofer? GPS/GNSS Spoofing Detection via Automatic Gain Control (AGC)

Cited by 206 publications

References 1 publication

A combined symmetric difference and power monitoring GNSS anti-spoofing technique

A combined symmetric difference and power monitoring GNSS anti-spoofing technique

Performance assessment of GPS receivers during the September 24, 2011 solar radio burst event

GNSS Receiver Anti-spoofing Techniques: A Review and Future Prospects

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