Who Rallies around the Flag? Nationalist Parties, National Security, and the 2019 Indian Election

Abstract

National security crises often generate a ‘rally‐around‐the‐flag’ effect, especially under nationalist administrations, but the salience of a security crisis varies within a country. Does exposure to a crisis intensify rallying by fomenting nationalism, inciting hawkishness, and distracting from quotidian economic concerns? Or does exposure deepen dissatisfaction with the incumbent, thereby reducing a rallying effect? We argue the latter using evidence from a difficult test in India. A major pre‐election terrorist attack boosted the nationwide popularity of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the nationalist ruling party. Yet we find that proximity to the victims’ funeral processions, which served as patriotic rallies, substantially reduced BJP support where the party was incumbent. The size and breadth of our observed effects indicate that the social commemoration of the attack, rather than direct personal connections to its victims, fuelled anti‐incumbent sentiment. Mobilizing collective anger after a crisis may dampen rather than augment a rally‐around‐the‐flag effect.

How COVID-19 affects voting for incumbents: Evidence from local elections in France

“…In the absence of retrospective evaluations, threatening events can still induce people to express greater support for incumbent political leaders via emotional reactions, the so-called 'rally-around-the-flag' effect [28][29][30]. This effect has been identified in relation to terrorist attacks (see for example [31][32][33][34][35]) and military crises [28], both of which have been found to lead to a boost in presidential popularity and government support. Recent studies have argued that the threat of COVID-19 should have similar rally effects [21], at least at the beginning of the pandemic.…”

War-Time Military Service Can Affect Partisan Preferences

“…In contrast, another strand of research suggests that citizens are sensitive to the high costs of war and tend to withdraw support from incumbents who get involved in costly wars (Gartner, Segura and Wilkening 1997;Gartner and Segura 1998;Kriner and Shen 2007;Getmansky and Weiss 2022). In line with these theories, there is evidence to suggest that exposure to the costs of violence (Hintson and Vaishnav 2021) and military casualties-especially if they are on the rise (Gartner and Segura 1998;Gartner 2008b)-has a negative effect on support for incumbents. Similarly, studies show that local casualties have a substantial effect on local-level support for incumbent leaders and parties (Hong and Kang 2017;Karol and Miguel 2007;Kriner and Shen 2007;Getmansky and Weiss 2022).…”